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Software startups in the United States continue to create new technologies 
that provide a high degree of interactivity among consumer devices such as 
mobile phones.  To protect their innovations, many companies acquire patents 
that contain method claims covering interactive technology.  These claims may 
require more than a single party to perform all the required steps.  To 
successfully enforce a patent when more than one party performs all of the steps 
of a claimed method, the Federal Circuit recently held that the patentee must 
show that one of the alleged infringers induced the infringement of the other 
party.  As a result, where inducement is not present, parties can use and 
benefit from new interactive technologies without liability for patent 
infringement.  Several commentators have suggested that patentees can avoid 
this fate by drafting better claims.  Unfortunately, given today’s advances in 
technology, even expert claim drafting cannot protect patentees from an 
unauthorized use of their innovative method.  Accordingly, this loophole in the 
law should be closed. 
This Article analyzes the development of joint infringement theory, 
including the Federal Circuit’s recent rehearing of its own decisions, in 
conjunction with advancements in technology.  This Article argues that the 
law should not focus solely on inducement.  Instead, this Article suggests an 
alternative approach that relies on practical considerations that the law 
traditionally considered in contributory infringement analysis.  The goal of 
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this approach is to increase the likelihood that the law will protect deserving 
interactive methods from infringement while balancing concerns that a broader 
policy will ensnare innocent actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you have developed a new social media service.  You 
are the first to offer this type of experience on the Internet.1  Early 
adopters proclaim that your service is the next Facebook, and the 
business becomes successful.2  You file a patent application on your 
invention that includes claims directed to the method of providing 
your social media service.  Years later, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) grants your patent, giving you the right 
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the method of 
providing your service.3 
Independently, Facebook decides to provide a similar media 
service. Facebook hosts the software that provides the service on its 
servers and disseminates to its business partners instructions on how 
to use the software.  This arrangement allows Facebook and its 
partners to perform some of the steps of your claimed method 
separately without any one actor performing every step.4 
Armed with a patent, you sue Facebook for patent infringement.  
After a grueling jury trial, the jury awards you millions of dollars in 
damages for lost profits.5  In addition, the judge grants a permanent 
injunction prohibiting Facebook from using your online service.6  
Unfortunately, on appeal you lose.7  Since you cannot provide any 
                                                 
 1. For one example of such a service, see Daniel Casciato, Grant Street Co. Gets 
$84.6 Million Award, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (ONLINE) (Aug. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.danielcasciato.com/portfolio/documents/GrantStreetCo.pdf (stating 
that Muniauction conducted the first online auction in 1997, having patented 
Internet bidding for municipal bonds). 
 2. Meaning the inventor has come up with an Internet-based service that seems 
destined to generate consumer excitement.  See, e.g., Christina Amoroso, Pinterest Is 
the New Facebook, N.Y. POST (Mar. 19, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/ 
entertainment/pinterest_is_the_new_facebook_LfoXeclYOLBVwunF1bhteM 
(describing the rise in popularity of the social media service Pinterest as “one of the 
world’s most-visited Websites”). 
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”). 
 4. From the consumer/user perspective the hypothetical service created by 
Facebook would perform similarly, if not identically, to the claimed service. 
 5. Muniauction, introduced at the beginning of this thought experiment, 
received just such a verdict.  See Casciato, supra note 1 (discussing Grant Street 
Group’s $84.6 million damage award after a federal jury found that Thomson Corp. 
and iDeal willfully infringed a patent for auctioning municipal bonds over the 
Internet). 
 6. See id. (reporting that Judge Gary Lancaster granted a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the future use and sale of the defendants’ electronic bid submission 
system). 
 7. See Thomson Wins Appeal of $77M Verdict in Suit on Bond Auction Patent, 
ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP., July 23, 2008, at 9 (characterizing the 
patent at issue as “a prime example of the types . . . that have bedeviled the courts” 
while reporting the Federal Circuit’s decision in favor of the defendant in 
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by 
ROBINSON.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED2 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:52 PM 
62 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:59 
evidence that Facebook induced its partners to perform some of the 
claimed method steps, the court holds that Facebook and its partners 
are not liable for patent infringement.8  Accordingly, because 
performance of your method is split among various actors, Facebook 
benefits from your innovation for free, essentially rendering your 
patent worthless.9 
The above scenario is fictional.  Unfortunately for some patentees, 
similar events have been occurring in the United Sates for at least the 
last five years.10  It could happen to any startup, not just the next 
Internet mogul.  For example, researchers at the University of 
Washington have developed a contact lens with integrated 
optoelectronic components such as control circuits, communication 
circuits, and antennas.11  The scientists believe the technology, 
although still in the early stages of development, will have hundreds 
of useful medical applications, including the ability to measure levels 
of cholesterol, potassium, and sodium in the body, as well as report 
those results, via a wireless transmitter, to a doctor or nurse.12  This 
                                                 
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
 8. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai II), 692 F.3d 
1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that there can be 
liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not performed by a single 
entity). 
 9. As Judge Newman remarked in her dissent from McKesson Technologies Inc. v. 
Epic Systems Corp., “[a] patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of 
infringement, is not a statutory patent right.  It is a cynical, and expensive, delusion 
to encourage innovators to develop new interactive procedures, only to find that the 
courts will not recognize the patent because the participants are independent 
entities.”  98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., 
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 1285 (majority opinion) (reminding the plaintiff that the 
“court has time and again rejected liability” absent agency or contract); Akamai 
Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I), 629 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (characterizing the requirement that a single party to perform every step 
in order to find infringement as “well settled,” and continuing to require direction 
or control over third parties), rev’d en banc, per curiam, 692 F.3d 1301; Golden Hour 
Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (agreeing with 
the lower court’s finding of no joint infringement); Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330 
(relying on BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), to 
reverse judgment in favor of the defendant without a showing of control or 
direction), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 
498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (requiring evidence that the defendant was 
“vicariously responsible for the actions of the unrelated parties”), overruled by Akamai 
II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 11. See Babak A. Parviz, Augmented Reality in a Contact Lens, IEEE SPECTRUM, (Sept. 
2009), http://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/bionics/augmented-reality-in-a-contact 
-lens/0 (overviewing technological add-ons to conventional polymer lenses). 
 12. See id. (contextualizing the research, which “barely hints at” near-future 
possibilities). 
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medical technology is most likely patentable.13  However, multiple 
parties could divide the performance of the steps of any claimed 
method for using the contact lens system to benefit from its 
innovations and avoid patent infringement.14 
This type of legal gamesmanship can occur under what is known as 
the “single entity” doctrine, where a single party must perform or use 
every step of the claimed method to be liable for direct 
infringement.15  While the theory of joint infringement provides for 
an alternative method of enforcement, the circumstances necessary 
to find joint liability for patent infringement when multiple parties 
perform every step of a method claim but no single party performs all 
of them have continued to change over the last five years.16 
In the last five years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has issued several opinions in joint infringement cases.17  In 
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,18 the court affirmed that, 
where multiple parties perform steps of a method claim, the entire 
method must be performed at the control or direction of the alleged 
direct infringer.19  Approximately one year later, in Muniauction, Inc. 
v. Thomson Corp.,20 the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, 
finding that “the control or direction standard is satisfied in 
situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct 
infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party 
that are required to complete performance of a claimed method.”21 
                                                 
 13. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (stating that patentable subject matter includes the 
discovery or invention of “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter”). 
 14. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“This court acknowledges that the standard 
requiring control or direction for a finding of joint infringement may in some 
circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid 
infringement.”). 
 15. See id. at 1378–79 (raising and rejecting the possibility that such a 
requirement “provide[s] a loophole for a party to escape infringement”). 
 16. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(reversing prior Federal Circuit decisions in BMC and Muniauction). 
 17. See, e.g., McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 
1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reviewing de novo and affirming judgment granted for 
the defendant as a matter of law on the question of joint infringement), rev’d sub 
nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same), 
rev’d, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 
F.3d 1367, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 
532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (brushing aside the parties’ relationships as 
irrelevant), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378 (considering 
the proper standard for joint infringement). 
 18. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 19. See id. at 1380–81 (conceding that the requirement sometimes allows arms-
length parties to avoid infringement, but nevertheless concluding that such concerns 
do not outweigh those of expanding direct infringement). 
 20. 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 21. Id. at 1330. 
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The Federal Circuit’s most recent decisions are the most 
controversial.  In Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 
(Akamai I),22 the Federal Circuit elaborated on the holdings in BMC 
and Muniauction, stating that the patentee must either prove that a 
mastermind is vicariously liable for the actions of the other party 
under traditional agency principles or that the other party is 
contractually obligated to the mastermind to perform the claimed 
step.23  In McKesson Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp.,24 the Federal 
Circuit closely followed the holding in Akamai I.25 
In her dissent in McKesson, Judge Newman highlighted 
inconsistencies in the court’s prior rulings and suggested that it had 
created further confusion by applying the single entity rule 
differently for system claims.26  Moreover, Judge Newman seemed to 
caution that the unintended consequence of the court’s prior joint 
infringement holdings was to devalue the advances in computer-
based technology that have enabled interactive methods.27  
Approximately one week later, the Federal Circuit vacated Akamai I 
and granted requests to rehear McKesson and Akamai en banc.28  
Almost a year later, a six judge majority for the Federal Circuit 
reversed its decisions in BMC and Muniauction and held that both 
joint infringement cases could be resolved through the application of 
the doctrine of induced infringement, leaving several important 
questions unanswered.29 
It is no accident that the Federal Circuit’s attention has been 
diverted to issues surrounding interactive methods over the past 
                                                 
 22. 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 23. See id. at 1319 (making explicit the implications of prior holdings that joint 
infringement could be perpetrated through an agency or contractual relationship). 
 24. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 
F.3d 1301. 
 25. See id. at 1284–85 (drawing multiple parallels with Akamai and ultimately 
holding in favor of the alleged infringer). 
 26. Id. at 1290 (Newman, J., dissenting).  An interactive system arises when 
different users, for example, physically control different interactive elements—a 
difficult distinction to make between interactive methods.  See id. at 1290 
(summarizing the distinction, contrasting the technical requirements of 
performance—where a single entity must control or direct every step—with the 
reality that a single entity can still cause and benefit from the process without much 
control (citing Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 
1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011))). 
 27. See id. at 1291 (understating the net effect as “curious” because “the 
burgeoning body of interactive computer-managed advances” no longer qualifies for 
patent protection). 
 28. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir. 
2011); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 29. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1305–07. 
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several years.  Facebook and Twitter were launched in 2004 and 2006 
respectively.30  A paradigm shift has occurred in the way humans 
work, play, and design technology:  everything is connected.31  In the 
wake of this technological paradigm shift, it is the unenviable job of 
the Federal Circuit to apply laws crafted in consideration of 1950’s 
technology to the cutting edge innovations of today.32 
Several commentators have suggested that patentees can avoid 
having to assert joint infringement by drafting better claims.33  
Unfortunately, given today’s advances in technology, even expert 
claim drafting cannot protect patentees from an unauthorized use of 
their innovative method.  Further, the Federal Circuit’s focus on the 
nature of the relationship between relevant actors ignores other 
practical factors that should be considered in determining liability for 
a joint infringement claim.34  Accordingly, the law should prescribe a 
more flexible procedure to analyze joint infringement liability. 
The proposed approach suggests that the law impose a two-prong 
test for method claim infringement when separate entities each 
                                                 
 30. See Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 4 (July 26, 2012); Nicholas 
Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUS. INSIDER, (Apr. 13, 2011), http://articles. 
businessinsider.com/2011-04-13/tech/29957143_1_jack-dorsey-twitter-
podcasting (reporting Twitter’s launch in fall of 2006). 
 31. In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn argued that 
scientific advancement, in one reviewer’s evocative words, “is a series of peaceful 
interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions” where one worldview 
replaces another.  Nicholas Wade, Thomas S. Kuhn:  Revolutionary Theorist of Science, 
197 SCIENCE 143, 144 (1977).  The recent rise and popularity of social media 
technologies exhibit this pattern.  Social media technologies (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, 
Google+) are Internet-based systems for the exchange of information between 
multiple users.  In addition, social media employ software programs (applications or 
“apps”) that facilitate interaction between software and users.  In sum, the very 
nature of social media and the benefits of its applications rely on the participation of 
multiple parties. 
 32. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (defining patentable subjects). 
 33. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringment Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 
256 (2005) (highlighting the commonality of distributed claims in computer 
networking and warning that patent owners will lack a remedy without careful 
drafting); Harold C. Wegner, Wordsmithing, Akamai and the “All Elements” Rule, GRAY 
ON CLAIMS 4 (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.grayonclaims.com/storage/ 
WordsmithingNov20_Version4.pdf (proposing the need for formal drafting 
licensure to “protect . . . America’s precious intellectual property”). 
 34. See, e.g., Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382–
83 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority’s 
holding incorrectly dismisses the defendants’ “strategic partnership” to sell software 
in divided units); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th 
Cir. 1897) (considering the “certain inference” that the use of the defendant’s 
product would infringe the plaintiff’s patent); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 
(C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100) (granting an injunction for the plaintiff because 
“the actual concert with others is a certain inference” even without “an actual pre-
arrangement with any particular person”). 
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perform separate steps of a method claim.35  The first prong of the 
test applies to (1) claims directed to a single entity or (2) claims that 
do not require participation of multiple entities.36  For these claims, 
in addition to the relationship between relevant actors, the law 
should consider and weigh several factors such as concerted action, 
commercial benefit, intent, and the nature of the activity 
performed.37  The second prong applies to claims that explicitly 
require participation of multiple entities.38  Here, the law should only 
consider the factors listed above if the patented claim intrinsically 
requires interactivity.39  If no nexus exists between the patentability of 
the claim and its claimed interactivity, then liability should depend 
solely on the nature of the relationship between relevant actors.40 
This Article does not suggest whether Congress, the courts, or both 
should enact this change.  Regardless of the source, the result—
addressing the peculiarities associated with joint infringement—will 
be the same.  The approach outlined above will prevent the 
misappropriation of patented technology, promote the public-notice 
function served by well-crafted claims, and shield innocent actors 
from strict liability. 
This Article contributes to the joint infringement literature in 
several ways.  First, it highlights that focusing on inducement or the 
relationships between entities ignores other practical factors that the 
law should consider in determining liability for joint infringement.41  
Second, it acknowledges that joint infringement can occur multiple 
                                                 
 35. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 36. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 37. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1382 (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing joint 
infringement in the context of extremely close collaboration); Thomson-Houston Elec., 
80 F. at 723–24 (rejecting contributory infringement and inferences basing 
judgment on the limited uses for the final product, i.e., its patented combination); 
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (concluding the patent did not protect the patentee if two 
manufacturers operated in parallel for the common purpose of avoiding 
infringement). 
 38. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 39. See Nari Lee, Fragmented Infringement of Computer Program Patents in the Global 
Economy, 48 IDEA 345, 349 (2008) (contrasting Internet-based patents whose value 
“likely . . . lies in the combinations of steps” against machines or processes merely 
connected to a network and arguing that expanding protection of the latter would 
be “over-reaching”). 
 40. See generally Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp. 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (relying on the control-or-direction standard for joint infringement claims), 
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); BMC 
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (focusing on vicarious 
liability to find non-infringement), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 41. See, e.g., Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1382–83 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing control or direction as too narrow a standard for joint infringement); 
Thomson-Houston Elec., 80 F. at 723–24 (focusing on actual concert of infringers); 
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (same). 
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ways and suggests that the rules for determining liability be flexible 
enough to take into account different possibilities.42  Third, this 
Article suggests a flexible approach for enforcing interactive method 
claims that are truly innovative while protecting innocent actors from 
infringement liability and placing a premium on well-crafted claims.43 
Part I of this Article discusses how the doctrine of joint 
infringement evolved from the common law.  In addition, Part I 
discusses the most recent developments concerning the doctrine of 
joint infringement.  Part II highlights certain factors that suggest that 
a more flexible approach to joint infringement is necessary.  Finally, 
Part III outlines the suggested approach to determine if a method 
claim is infringed when separate entities each perform separate steps 
of the method claim. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the last five years, the Federal Circuit has struggled with the 
doctrine of joint infringement.44  In Akamai I, the Federal Circuit 
requested that both parties address (1) the circumstances under 
which a method claim would be directly infringed when separate 
entities each perform separate steps of the method claim and (2) the 
extent to which each of the parties would be liable.45  In McKesson, the 
Federal Circuit asked the parties to address two questions:  (1) In 
which circumstances, if any, would an entity or third party be liable 
for inducing infringement or contributory infringement having 
separately performed the steps of a method claim, and (2) “[d]oes 
the nature of the relationship between the relevant actors—e.g., 
service provider/user; doctor/patient—affect the question of direct 
or indirect infringement liability?”46  Thus, the fundamental question 
before the Federal Circuit was under what circumstances 
                                                 
 42. See discussion infra Part III. 
 43. See discussion infra Part III. 
 44. The evolution of the doctrine proceeded from BMC, where the Federal 
Circuit considered the question of the proper standard for joint infringement, 
having already phrased the district court’s perspective of “[f]inding no law on 
point.”  498 F.3d at 1378.  In turn, Muniauction, relied on BMC for an “axiomatic” 
statement of the law regarding infringement.  532 F.3d at 1328.  Golden Hour cited 
both Muniauction and BMC for joint infringement doctrine, 614 F.3d at 1380, as did 
Akamai I, adding that “BMC Resources established a foundational basis” to determine 
joint infringement liability, 629 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Finally, McKesson incorporated Akamai’s holding with respect 
to agency relationships.  98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d 
sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 45. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 46. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (per curiam). 
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infringement liability exists when separate entities each perform 
separate steps of a method claim.47 
Surprisingly, in the majority’s per curiam opinion, issued on 
August 31, 2012, the Federal Circuit failed to answer most of these 
questions.48  Instead, the court explained that the cases could be 
resolved through application of the doctrine of induced 
infringement and declined to address when direct infringement 
could be found or opine on the “single entity” doctrine.49  By 
reframing the issue, the majority sidestepped the main controversy 
that gave rise to the appeal.  Thus, fundamental questions remain 
unanswered. 
The joint infringement doctrine was a judicially created exception 
rooted in the theory of common law contributory infringement.  In 
order to place the doctrine in proper context for analysis, this Part 
briefly reviews the evolution of the doctrine of contributory 
infringement from common law to its codification in the Patent Act 
of 1952.50  Next, this Part explains the establishment and application 
of the Federal Circuit’s joint infringement standard.  Finally, this Part 
concludes with a review of the demise of the doctrine of joint 
infringement and an introduction of the new inducement-only 
standard. 
A. Early Law Concerning Patent Infringement 
The idea of joint infringement is derived from the doctrine of 
indirect infringement.51  Today, indirect infringement generally 
refers to the acts defined under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), inducing direct 
infringement, and 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), contributing to direct 
infringement.52  Both provisions impose liability upon parties that aid 
                                                 
 47. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(distilling the question as “identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold 
one individual accountable for the actions of another” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 48. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).  
The Federal Circuit decided the Akamai and McKesson rehearings collectively as 
Akamai II.  Id. at 1305–06. 
 49. See id. at 1306. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
 51. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(summarizing that a participant in infringement does so either directly or 
indirectly), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 52. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS:  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 17.01, at 17-2 (2011) (overviewing types 
of infringement in relation to U.S. Code provisions); see also Dynacore Holdings 
Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (predicating 
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or abet direct infringement by another party.53  Historically, the 
common law referred to both types of indirect infringement simply as 
“contributory infringement.”54 
Common law contributory infringement was codified by Congress 
in the Patent Act of 1952 to address legal issues arising from a 
common yet, particular set of facts.55  Specifically, early contributory 
infringement cases dealt mostly with fact patterns that involved the 
sale of an unpatented component in an infringing combination.56  
Cases were common where one party sold an item that enabled 
another party to make or use a patented machine, process, or 
combination.57  Therefore, a review of the development of common 
law contributory infringement will place the doctrine of joint 
infringement in its proper context. 
1. Common law contributory infringement 
Before the Patent Act of 1952, courts categorized patent 
infringement as (1) direct infringement or (2) contributory 
infringement under a theory of joint tortfeasance.58  Although the law 
now distinguishes between inducement and contributory 
infringement, the two were once the same concept—contributory 
infringement.59  Under this early formulation of contributory 
infringement, “one who intentionally caused, or aided and abetted, 
the commission of a tort by another was jointly and severally liable 
with the primary tortfeasor.”60  As illustrated below, factors that 
assisted early courts in determining contributory infringement were 
                                                 
indirect infringement on initially finding direct infringement).  The plaintiff’s 
“failure to prove direct infringement . . . necessarily doom[ed] its allegations of 
indirect infringement.”  Dynacore Holdings, 363 F.3d at 1277. 
 53. CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.01, at 17-2. 
 54. See id. § 17.02, at 17-3 & n.1 (recounting joint tortfeasance and its relation to 
35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(d)). 
 55. See id. § 17.02[6], at 17-24 (emphasizing that Congress viewed the judicial 
doctrine of contributory infringement as an important innovation when it enacted 
the Patent Act of 1952). 
 56. See, e.g., id. § 17.02, at 17-3 (labeling Wallace v. Holmes as the “leading case” 
regarding unpatented components assembled into infringing combinations). 
 57. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2066 (2011) 
(tracing the dearth of clear case law to the early lack of distinction between such 
cases and the less common inducement cases); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch 
& Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (highlighting the most common 
scenario involving the 1952 component cases). 
 58. See Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469. 
 59. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 (“Before 1952, both the conduct now 
covered by § 271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now addressed by 
§ 271(c) (sale of a component of a patented invention) were viewed as falling within 
the overarching concept of ‘contributory infringement.’”). 
 60. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469. 
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concerted action, intent, and the nature of the relationship between 
the parties.61 
a. Concerted action 
Before the Patent Act of 1952, most courts adhered to the 
principles that (1) whoever uses a patent without permission is an 
infringer and (2) whoever contributes to such use is also an 
infringer.62  Wallace v. Holmes63 is a notable case that applies common 
law principles of joint tortfeasance in the context of patent 
infringement.64  The plaintiff in Wallace alleged that the defendants 
infringed a patent for an improvement of a lamp.65  The patent 
claimed a burner and a chimney that were combined to form the 
improved lamp.66  The defendants asserted that they did not infringe 
any of the claims of the patent on the grounds that they only made 
and sold some of the parts of the lamp.67  Specifically, the defendants 
manufactured the lamp burner and left it to the purchasers of the 
burner to supply the chimney.68  The defendants argued that “where 
a patent is for a combination merely, it is not infringed by one who 
uses one or more of the parts, but not all, to produce the same 
results, either by themselves, or by the aid of other devices.”69 
The court acknowledged that the rule articulated by the 
defendants was well settled.70  However, the court rejected application 
of the rule to the facts at issue.71  Instead, the court stated that if, in 
concert, the defendant made the burner and a third party provided 
the chimney then both parties must be deemed joint infringers.72  
The court noted that while there was no evidence that the defendants 
prearranged with a third party to combine its burner with a chimney, 
every sale of the burner made by the defendant was a proposal to the 
purchaser to supply the chimney.73  In turn, the purchaser, by 
                                                 
 61. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.a–c. 
 62. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[2], at 17-11 (noting that the Supreme 
Court distinguished between “impermissible ‘reconstruction’ rather than ‘repair’” 
(quoting Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325, 333 (1909))). 
 63. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). 
 64. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02, at 17-3 (chronicling the evolution of 
contributory infringement, starting with Wallace). 
 65. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 77. 
 66. Id. at 78–79. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 79–80. 
 69. Id. at 80. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (emphasizing the codependence of the parts and their usefulness only 
when sold together). 
 73. Id. (recognizing that a burner was of little value without a chimney). 
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purchasing the burner, consented to supplying or causing the 
chimney to be supplied to the burner.74  Thus, based solely on their 
actions, the court concluded that the manufacturer of the burner 
and the customer purchasing the burner for combination with a 
chimney were “active parties to the whole infringement.”75 
b. Intent 
Alternatively, in other early contributory infringement cases, courts 
considered the intent of the relevant actors.76  Generally, these cases 
concerned the sale of generic components for use in a patented 
article.77  One early case dealing with contributory infringement held 
that there must be some intent (inferred or otherwise) on the part of 
a seller to have the sold article used in an infringing way.78  
Subsequent cases found no liability where a component sold by an 
alleged infringer had other uses in addition to being used in a 
patented combination.79 
However, this principle was limited by the Sixth Circuit in Thomson-
Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.80  The court stated that liability 
could be found if the plaintiff affirmatively showed that the 
defendant-seller intended to assist in the infringement.81  The court 
explained that intent could be shown by knowledge or indifference 
of the defendant as to the consequences of its act.82  Later decisions 
found contributory infringement where the sale of components was 
accompanied by active inducement in the form of instructions, 
                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1912) (explaining that 
while certain generic items can be manufactured, they may not be sold with the 
intent to infringe a patent), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 77. See id. at 11 (evaluating the sale of ink used in a mimeograph); Thomson-
Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th Cir. 1897) (explaining that 
the products sold had no innocent use); see also CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[1], at 
17-6 (distinguishing innocent use of items from infringing use directed via 
advertisement or instruction). 
 78. See Henry, 224 U.S. at 48 (requiring intent and purpose of use); see also 
Thomson-Houston, 80 F. at 723 (determining that it is the duty of a defendant to 
ensure that combinations of product used to intentionally infringe be limited to what 
is “lawfully organized”); CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[1], at 17-4 to -5 (explaining 
that knowledge of infringing use is not required if intent to infringe is present). 
 79. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[1], at 17-4 to -5 (distinguishing those 
products that had an innocent use as well as an infringing use). 
 80. 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897). 
 81. Id. at 723–24 (drawing an inference of intention where the article could only 
be used in patented combination). 
 82. See id. at 723 (giving a defendant a duty of investigation and inability to be 
indifferent as to whether a product will be used in an infringing manner). 
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advertising, or other steps indicating the intent of the defendant that 
the component be used in an infringing fashion.83 
c. The relationship between the parties 
As early as 1825, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
relationship between alleged joint tortfeasors was a factor in 
determining infringement liability.  In Keplinger v. De Young,84 the 
Court agreed with a lower court’s instruction that the defendant did 
not infringe because the defendant had no connection with a user of 
the patented machine other than a purchase contract.85  However, 
the Court acknowledged the possibility that the defendant might be 
liable if the claimant could offer evidence of a connection in addition 
to the purchase contract or a transaction intended to evade the law.86  
Thus, by inquiring into whether the parties attempted to evade the 
law, the Supreme Court suggested it would consider other factors 
related to how or why infringement occurred in addition to the 
relationship between relevant actors.87 
In sum, early courts considered the actions of the parties, intent of 
the parties, and the nature of the relationship between the parties 
when determining whether more than one party infringed a patent.  
Congress codified the common law in the Patent Act of 1952.88  While 
some of the general principles established by the courts remained, 
Congress narrowed their application to specific situations.89 
2. The Patent Act of 1952 
The Patent Act of 1952 maintained the common law category of 
direct infringement and contributory infringement, and clarified 
                                                 
 83. See Weed Chain Tire Grip Co. v. Cleveland Chain & Mfg. Co., 196 F. 213, 215 
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1910) (holding the defendant liable for infringement when he sold 
products with attached tag including instructions); Holly v. Vergennes Mach. Co., 4 
F. 74, 82 (C.C.D. Vt. 1880) (concluding that providing a patented product for an 
infringing purpose made defendants liable as infringers); CHISUM, supra note 52, 
§ 17.02[1], at 17-6 & n.8 (specifying cases in which patented articles sold alongside 
instructions were found to be active inducement). 
 84. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 358 (1825). 
 85. See id. at 365 (pivoting the decision on the contractual relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant). 
 86. See id. at 366 (emphasizing that the jury had sufficient latitude as instructed 
to find infringement if more nefarious circumstances had manifested). 
 87. See id. (declining to investigate such questions because they were not before 
the Court). 
 88. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C.); see CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[6], at 17-24 (clarifying that the purpose 
of codification was to eliminate doubt and confusion). 
 89. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006) (limiting the scope of the section by using 
the words “knowing” and “actively”). 
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their definitions.  The Patent Act defines direct infringement as the 
unauthorized making, using, or selling of the patented invention.90  
Contributory infringement was originally defined judicially as any 
activity other than direct infringement where the defendant 
“displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable as an infringer.”91  
Section 271(b)–(d) of the Patent Act is directed to contributory 
infringement.92  Section 271 separates common law contributory 
infringement into two categories, one covered by § 271(b) and the 
other covered by § 271(c).93 
Section 271(a)–(c), as it is currently written, reads as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any 
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
infringes the patent. 
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer. 
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or 
imports into the United States a component of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material 
or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a 
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable 
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer.94 
The remainder of this Part will focus on § 271(b) and (c). 
a. Inducement 
Section 271(b) states that “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”95  Section 
271(b) codifies the case law developed prior to 1952 on contributory 
infringement other than infringement caused by the sale of a 
                                                 
 90. Id. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers, to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . .”). 
 91. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (outlining the history of direct and indirect infringement). 
 92. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(d). 
 93. Id. § 271(b)–(c); see also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 
2060, 2067 (2011) (highlighting that both actively inducing infringement and 
importing or offering to sell a component of a patented device with the knowledge 
that such a component is not a commerce commodity will constitute contributory 
infringement). 
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)–(c). 
 95. Id. § 271(b). 
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component especially adapted for infringing use.96  Under this 
provision, liability exists if an inducer specifically intends to cause, 
urge, encourage or aid another to infringe a patent.97  Broadly 
speaking, Congress intended for § 271(b) to impose infringement 
liability on anyone who aids or abets infringement.98  In subsequent 
cases under § 271(b), courts enforced but did not expand “the judge-
made doctrine of contributory infringement under which a person 
who knowingly aids, encourages or abets the direct infringement of a 
patent is to be held liable as a contributory infringer.”99 
b. Contributory infringement 
Section 271(c) concerns the sale or importation into the United 
States of “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the 
invention.”100  Here, if the seller knows that the component is 
“especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of 
such patent” and the component is “not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use” 
then the seller is liable as a contributory infringer.101 
Section 271(c) concerns, what was at the time, the most common 
form of contributory infringement.102  That is, Congress intended for 
§ 271(c) to apply to parties who sold a component of a patented 
invention for use in that invention.  If the alleged defendant did not 
sell the component then § 271(c) does not apply.103  In its application, 
courts held suppliers of replacement parts, designed for use in 
repairing infringing articles, liable for contributory infringement.104  
                                                 
 96. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.02[6], at 17-24 (clarifying that the purpose of 
codification was to eliminate doubt and confusion). 
 97. Id. § 17.01, at 17-2. 
 98. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 28 (1952) (declaring the purpose of the 1952 
amendment). 
 99. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 348 
(1961) (Black, J., concurring) (reviewing the legislative history in its application of 
indirect infringement). 
 100. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
 101. Id.; CHISUM, supra note 52, § 17.01, at 17-2. 
 102. See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 28 (characterizing § 271(c) as applying to “one 
who sells a component part of a patented invention or material or apparatus for use 
therein”). 
 103. See Jones v. Radio Corp. of Am., 131 F. Supp. 82, 83–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) 
(explaining that in light of the legislative history of the 1952 Act, § 271(c) does not 
apply if the defendant did not sell a component of the patented combination). 
 104. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485–86 
(1964) (stressing that such instances exemplified the types of case law results that 
§ 271(c) was intended to codify); Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 113–14 
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Thus, § 271(c) codified the law concerning the common, pre-1952 
contributory infringement case where “a seller would sell a 
component which was not itself technically covered by the claims of a 
product or process patent but had no other use except with the 
claimed product or process.”105 
c. Judicially created doctrines and clarifications 
Through the process of applying § 271, the courts established 
several judicially created doctrines.  For example, the “all limitations” 
or “all elements” rule states that the patented invention is defined by 
each and every limitation of the claim being asserted.106  Courts 
established that the initial question regarding the issue of 
infringement is whether the accused device or method falls within 
the literal scope of the language of the claims.107  A device “literally 
infringes” a claim when every limitation of the claim can be found in 
the accused device.108  If literal infringement is established, that is 
normally the end of the inquiry.109 
A second doctrine the courts established was the doctrine of 
equivalents.  The doctrine of equivalents provides that an infringer 
may not pirate an invention simply by avoiding the literal language of 
a claim.110  To infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, an accused 
method or device must include each and every step or element of a 
                                                 
(1922) (holding that the sale of spare parts for use in patented machines was an 
infringing use). 
 105. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 106. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or 
element of a claimed method or product.”), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v. Integrated Liner 
Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Infringement of process 
inventions is subject to the ‘all-elements rule’ whereby each of the claimed steps of a 
patented process must be performed in an infringing process, literally or by an 
equivalent of that step, with due attention to the role of each step in the context of 
the patented invention.”). 
 107. See Canton Bio-Med., 216 F.3d at 1370 (explaining that infringement of a 
method can occur by a literally infringing process, or by an equivalent of the claimed 
steps). 
 108. Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 109. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) 
(articulating that the first step in assessing the validity of a patent infringement claim 
is to look to the actual words of the claim and assess whether the accused device or 
component clearly falls within the claim). 
 110. See id. (explaining that the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to 
individual elements of the claim rather than to the invention as a whole, thus 
ensuring proper patent protection). 
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claim or its equivalent.111  These doctrines work together.  For 
example, under both literal infringement and the doctrine of 
equivalents, the “all elements” rule still requires that for there to be 
use of a patented invention, an entity must practice each and every 
step, or its equivalent, of a claimed method.112 
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified that § 271(b) and (c) 
require an accused infringer to have knowledge of the infringed 
patent in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.113  In Global-Tech, the 
Supreme Court explained that § 271(b) and (c) have the same 
knowledge requirement:  That the accused have knowledge of the 
patent’s existence.114  That is, both subsections require that the 
defendant knew that the induced acts would constitute patent 
infringement.115  In addition to clarifying the knowledge requirement, 
the Court also determined that § 271(b) required the alleged 
infringer to take affirmative steps to lead, prevail, move by 
persuasion, or influence another to infringe a patent.116 
d. Summary 
Section 271(b) and (c) were codified to cover specific examples of 
contributory infringement.  Since 1952, the courts have created 
doctrines within the scope of § 271,117 and Congress has amended the 
section to close loopholes in the law.118  However, neither § 271 nor 
                                                 
 111. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) 
(stating that “[e]ach element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to 
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents 
must be applied to individual elements of the claim”).  “[T]he doctrine of 
equivalents is not a license to ignore or ‘erase . . . structural and functional 
limitations of the claim,’ limitations ‘on which the public is entitled to rely in 
avoiding infringement.’”  Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 
1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).  Thus, if a claim element is completely 
missing from an accused device (that is, the claim element is not literally present in 
the device, and the equivalent to the claim element is not present), then there can 
be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law.  Warner-
Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.  This is the so-called “all elements” rule. 
 112. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (restating the “all elements” rule as laid out in BMC), overruled by Akamai II, 
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 113. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
 114. Id. at 2068 (“In light of the ‘special force’ of the doctrine of stare decisis with 
regard to questions of statutory interpretation, we proceed on the premise that 
§ 271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is infringed.  Based 
on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for induced 
infringement under § 271(b).” (citation omitted)). 
 115. Id. at 2068. 
 116. Id. at 2065 (interpreting § 271(b) despite absence of an explicit “intent” 
requirement but rather an “induce” requirement). 
 117. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 118. For example, § 271(f) was created to cover infringement by exporting the 
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the judicial doctrines that fall within its framework are fully 
comprehensive.  This has become clearer as courts struggle to apply 
§ 271 in recent cases involving interactive methods. 
B. Joint Infringement 
In 2007, the Federal Circuit had its first opportunity to hear a case 
in which the patentee asserted infringement based on a theory of 
joint infringement in BMC.119  Although the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s finding of non-infringement, it used the occasion to 
establish the “control or direction” test.120  A year later, the Federal 
Circuit further clarified this joint infringement standard in 
Muniauction by finding that no infringement occurred where the 
actions of the secondary actor were not done on behalf of the 
primary actor.121  In the years following BMC and Muniauction, district 
courts struggled to apply the direction or control test in various 
factual scenarios.122  Finally, on August 31, 2012, a fractured Federal 
Circuit overruled BMC and Muniauction, holding that there can be 
liability for induced infringement where all the steps are not 
performed by a single entity.123 
1. The genesis of the joint infringement doctrine 
In BMC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sought to 
clarify “the proper standard for whether a method claim is directly 
infringed by the combined actions of multiple parties.”124  In this 
infringement action, BMC asserted two patents that disclosed a 
method requiring the combined action of several distinct 
participants.125  The patents claimed a method for providing an 
interface between a standard touch-tone telephone and a debit card 
network in order to process debit transactions without using a PIN 
                                                 
components of a patented invention and assembling them abroad.  35 U.S.C.  
§ 271(f) 2006). 
 119. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 120. Id. at 1380–81 (acknowledging that a standard possibly resulting in arms-
length agreements to avoid infringement did not outweigh concerns over expanding 
the law surrounding direct infringement). 
 121. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 122. See generally Alice Juwon Ahn, Finding Vicarious Liability in U.S. Patent Law:  The 
“Control or Direction” Standard for Joint Infringement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149 (2009) 
(discussing that the amount of control or direction necessary to trigger liability is still 
unclear and reviewing district court decisions attempting to apply the test). 
 123. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1306. 
 124. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329 (reviewing the analysis in BMC). 
 125. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375. 
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number.126  To carry out the transaction, the patented method 
required participation from a customer, debit network, and financial 
institution.127 
The accused infringer, Paymentech, provided financial transaction 
processing services to its merchant clients who collected payment 
information from customers and sent it to Paymentech.128  
Paymentech sent that information to a participating debit network 
who forwarded the information to an affiliated financial institution.129  
The financial institution authorized or declined the transaction and 
sent transaction status information back to Paymentech via the debit 
network.130 
BMC demanded that Paymentech obtain a license to use its 
patented technology when it learned of Paymentech’s plans to 
provide services to BMC’s clients.131  As a result, Paymentech filed suit 
in federal district court seeking a declaration of non-infringement 
with respect to the BMC patents.132  BMC counterclaimed and alleged 
that Paymentech directly infringed one method claim in each of U.S. 
Patent Numbers 5,718,298 (the ‘298 patent) and 5,870,456 (the ‘456 
patent).133 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Paymentech 
argued that it did not perform all of the steps of the patented method 
alone or in concert with its customers.134  In response, BMC argued 
that under the Federal Circuit’s decision in On Demand Machine Corp. 
v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,135 a plaintiff must show “participation and 
combined action” on the part of the alleged infringer as the type of 
“connection” needed to prove joint infringement.136  BMC concluded 
that Paymentech infringed the asserted claims under the 
“participation and combined action” standard.137 
The district court disagreed with BMC and found that Paymentech 
would only infringe the claims if the record showed that it directed or 
controlled the behavior of the financial institutions that performed 
                                                 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1375–76. 
 128. Id. at 1375. 
 129. Id. at 1376. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1375–76. 
 134. Id. at 1377. 
 135. 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 136. BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (quoting On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1331) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 137. See id. at 1380 (arguing that On Demand had changed the law for joint 
infringement and that Paymentech’s actions thus qualified as infringement). 
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those claimed method steps that Paymentech itself did not perform.138  
Since the record did not contain any evidence of direction or control, 
the district court granted Paymentech’s motion for summary 
judgment.139 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit also rejected BMC’s argument 
regarding joint infringement.140  Instead, the Federal Circuit stated 
that “[w]hen a defendant . . . does not directly infringe a patent, the 
normal recourse under the law is for the court to apply the standards 
for liability under indirect infringement.”141  The court went on to 
explain that a finding of indirect infringement requires that a party 
amongst the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct 
infringement.142 
Relying on the past decisions of other courts, the Federal Circuit 
refused to find joint liability where one party did not control or direct 
each step of the patented process.143  However, in cases where a 
mastermind had a third party carry out one or more steps of a claim, 
the court stated that the party in control would be liable for direct 
infringement.144 
In its opinion, the Federal Circuit refused to expand the doctrine 
of joint infringement to cover the independent conduct of multiple 
actors and acknowledged that this created a loophole where parties 
could enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement 
under the control or direction standard.145  Instead of judicially 
closing this loophole, the court suggested that this concern could be 
addressed by patentees drafting method claims capturing the 
infringement of a single entity.146 
The Federal Circuit concluded that Paymentech did not infringe 
under its newly minted control or direction standard.147  The court 
                                                 
 138. See id. at 1378 (rejecting the On Demand language as dicta and finding no 
other district court decisions that followed a changed rule for joint infringement). 
 139. See id. (finding that even under a looser standard, Paymentech would still not 
infringe the patent claims according to the facts in the record). 
 140. See id. at 1380 (concluding that On Demand did not change the standard for 
joint infringement). 
 141. Id. at 1379. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 1380 (citing district court decisions that did not find infringement in 
arms-length agreements and divided performance situations). 
 144. See id. at 1381 (arguing that contracting out steps to specifically avoid 
infringement would still result in liability for the mastermind). 
 145. See id. (noting that expanding the standard to avoid the arms-length 
agreement loophole would not outweigh concerns over expanding the rule beyond 
the statutory language). 
 146. See id. (arguing that BMC could have avoided the claim by drafting its patent 
so that each step did not require a different actor). 
 147. See id. 
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noted that (1) there was no evidence that Paymentech provided its 
customers or financial institutions with instructions or directions for 
the use of the data it provided,148 and (2) the record contained no 
evidence of a contractual relationship between Paymentech and the 
financial institutions.149  Thus, without evidence of direction or 
control of both the debit networks and the financial institutions, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that Paymentech did not perform or cause 
to be performed each and every element of the claims.150 
2. The multi-party spectrum defined 
One year later in Muniauction, the Federal Circuit modified the 
direction or control standard to an “on behalf of” standard.151  In 
Muniauction, the patentee asserted that the defendant, Thomson, 
infringed its patent under a theory of joint infringement.152  The 
patent claimed a method for conducting an auction of financial 
instruments over a network using a web browser.153  Thomson owned 
the accused process, which allowed users to issue bids over a network 
using a web browser.154  A jury found that Thomson willfully infringed 
Muniauction’s claims.155  On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed 
whether the action of the bidder and auctioneer could be combined 
to give rise to a finding of direct infringement by the auctioneer.156 
The Federal Circuit described the fact scenarios under which joint 
infringement had been asserted as a “multi-party spectrum.” 157  At 
one end of the spectrum, a claim is directly infringed “if one party 
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every 
step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”158  
At the other end of the spectrum, a claim would not be directly 
                                                 
 148. See id. at 1381–82 (rejecting BMC’s argument that the instructions could be 
inferred from the data provision). 
 149. See id. at 1382. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (building on the direction or control standard articulated in BMC, namely that 
the control of access to a system is not sufficient to incur liability), overruled by Akamai 
II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Ken Hobday, 
Comment, The Incredibly Ever-Shrinking Theory of Joint Infringement:  Multi-Actor Method 
Claims, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2009) (arguing that the “on behalf of” 
standard goes unnecessarily beyond the BMC standard). 
 152. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1323. 
 153. Id. at 1321–23 (explaining that the patent was for a process whereby the 
municipality offered bonds to underwriters who then bid on and purchased the 
offering and resold the individual bonds to the public). 
 154. Id. at 1323. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1328–29. 
 157. Id. at 1329. 
 158. Id. 
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infringed if there was only evidence of “mere ‘arms-length 
cooperation’” between multiple parties that in combination 
performed every step of a claimed method.159 
Having set forth these boundaries, the court opined that one 
factual scenario160 in which the control or direction standard would 
be satisfied is “where the law would traditionally hold the accused 
direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another 
party that are required to complete performance of a claimed 
method.”161  Under this framework, the court decided that Thomson 
did not infringe the asserted claims since Thomson did not have 
another party perform steps of the method claim on its behalf.162  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit stated that evidence that Thomson 
controlled access to the system and instructed bidders on its use was 
insufficient to incur liability for direct infringement.163  Thus, in 
Muniauction, the Federal Circuit narrowed the joint infringement 
doctrine articulated in BMC.164 
3. Application of the direction or control test 
Following BMC and Muniauction, several district courts applied the 
direction or control test to various factual scenarios with generally 
predictable results.165  In evaluating the relationships between the 
                                                 
 159. Id. 
 160. Presumably the court left the door open for other scenarios. 
 161. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. (finding the evidence insufficient under the BMC “control or 
direction” standard). 
 164. See Hobday, supra note 151, at 140–41 (arguing that Muniauction’s added 
requirement that the alleged infringer’s actions must violate traditional 
requirements for vicarious liability narrows the BMC standard). 
 165. See, e.g., Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 237 
(D. Del. 2009) (denying a motion for summary judgment because there was a 
question of material fact as to Movielink’s control over its downloaded movie 
programs); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 122–
23 (D. Mass. 2009) (ruling that Limelight did not infringe upon Akamai’s content 
delivery process because the customer was required to perform a step of Limelight’s 
process and that step was not a contractual obligation for using Limelight’s services), 
aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, per curiam, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 838 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 
(holding that contracts requiring physicians performing remote diagnoses as part of 
a patented “telemedicine” system to get insurance, follow professional standards, 
and schedule on-call times merely set basic parameters and were insufficient to prove 
control); Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 
1332–33, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding no infringement when remote users of 
Global Patent’s Remote Query Communication System downloaded files from the 
system because Global Patent could not prove the users were directed or controlled 
by Panthers even though the downloaded material was used to render material for 
Panthers’ website), aff’d per curiam, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  See generally W. 
Keith Robinson, Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology 
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parties involved, most courts found that the factual situations with 
which they were presented did not satisfy the control or direction 
standard.166  It is unclear whether the outcome of these cases would 
change under the newly minted inducement-only rule.  However, the 
lack of fact patterns that satisfied the control or direction test most 
likely played a part in its demise.167 
For example, evidence of mere guidance or instruction is 
insufficient to satisfy the direction or control standard.168  In Global 
Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BHRC LLC,169 the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida stated that the Federal Circuit did 
not intend for evidence of mere guiding or instructing conduct in 
some of the steps of a method claim to satisfy the direction or control 
standard.170  Instead, the district court stated that a contractual 
obligation or other relationship that gave rise to vicarious liability 
must exist to warrant a finding of joint infringement.171  Similarly, 
other courts have found that “[g]iving instructions or prompts to the 
third party in its performance of the steps necessary to complete 
infringement, or facilitating or arranging for the third-party’s 
involvement in the alleged infringement, are not sufficient” evidence 
of “direction or control.” 172 
In applying the control or direction test, other courts have 
explained that a contract, by itself, is still not sufficient for a finding 
of direction or control.  Generally, district courts have found that 
evidence of a contract for services between a content provider and a 
customer and instructions on how to use those services is not 
sufficient evidence of direction or control.173  Instead, even where a 
                                                 
Patents, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335 (2010) (discussing in-depth how courts have 
applied BMC and Muniauction). 
 166. See, e.g., Global Patent, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (“[T]he court indicated that 
the third party must perform the steps of the patented process by virtue of a 
contractual obligation or other relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability in 
order for a court to find ‘direction or control.’”). 
 167. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1307. 
 168. See id. 
 169. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d per curiam, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 170. See id. at 1335 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 
(finding that video conferencing network link providers did not infringe on a patent 
for “telemedicine” services because the physicians remotely linked to the remote 
patient had to perform the medical diagnoses and care instructions, thereby 
removing one step of the process from the network providers). 
 173. See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 
121 (D. Mass. 2009) (explaining that Muniauction requires evidence beyond an arms-
length agreement to show direction and control), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
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contract may exist, courts have indicated that evidence that the 
accused party directed or controlled how a third party performed the 
steps of a method claim may also be required for a finding of 
direction and control.174 
In contrast, the court in American Patent Development Corp. v. 
Movielink, LLC,175 stated that evidence of software running on a third 
party system that was continuously controlled by an accused infringer 
may be sufficient to support a claim for infringement under a joint 
infringement theory.176  Here, one of the asserted patents was 
directed to a system for limiting the use of a downloaded video 
program purchased by a customer from a “central station” that 
transmits a “video product” to a customer at a “user site.” 177  The 
claims at issue were methods for limiting the customer’s access to the 
video programming based on predetermined viewing limits.178 
American Patent Development Corporation (“APDC”) asserted, 
under a joint infringement theory, that Movielink infringed its 
claims.179  APDC noted that in order to use the accused Movielink 
service, a customer must have Movielink Manager software installed 
on the computer.180  In response, Movielink argued that it “did not 
control its customers’ computers, or the software running on 
them.”181  In response, the district court rejected Movielink’s 
arguments.  The court noted that in Movielink’s product 
documentation, the Movielink Manager was described as being 
tightly integrated with its server software, and was repeatedly depicted 
as a component in a larger Movielink product offering.182  Further, 
the court noted that Movielink had the capacity to revoke customer 
                                                 
2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301; Gammino v. Cellco P’ship, 527 F. Supp. 2d 395, 398 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007) (noting that parties cannot contract around steps to avoid infringement 
charges but finding insufficient evidence of control because the contracting party 
did not know how the third party performed the step). 
 174. See Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (noting that district courts after Muniauction 
specifically require evidence of performance according to the defendant’s 
instructions and not merely performance “prompted or facilitated” by the 
defendant). 
 175. 637 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Del. 2009). 
 176. See id. at 236 (denying summary judgment due to the sufficient evidence in 
the record suggesting continuing control). 
 177. Id. at 227. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 236 (emphasizing Movielink’s attempt to demonstrate that control 
required a showing of ability “to fundamentally manage or influence the functioning 
of the thing allegedly being controlled”). 
 182. See id. at 237 (noting that these characteristics influenced the court’s 
interpretation of the level of control). 
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licenses through use of the Movielink Manager.183  Thus, the court 
concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Movielink exercised continuing control over the software 
running on the customers’ computer.184 
In addition, district courts have found that evidence that an alleged 
infringer caused third parties to perform in accordance with specific 
instructions and requirements may be sufficient to support a claim 
for joint infringement.  In Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc.,185 the court 
reviewed several district court cases heard after BMC and Muniauction 
for guidance.186  The court noted that in several cases, the alleged 
infringer provided precise specifications or requirements for 
performing steps of the claimed method.187  In these cases, the court 
granted summary judgment under a theory of joint infringement 
where there was insufficient evidence of specific instruction to 
control third party performance.188 
In sum, the initial standard for joint infringement was set forth in 
BMC and Muniauction.  In most cases, courts applying BMC or 
Muniauction did not find that there was evidence of direction or 
control or an agency relationship between potential infringing 
parties.  A handful of districts found otherwise; however, these rulings 
would later be called into question by the Federal Circuit’s 
application of the “single entity” rule.189 
4. The “single entity” rule 
The “single entity” rule states that direct infringement under 
§ 271(a) requires a showing that a single party practiced each and 
every element of the claimed invention.190  The single entity rule is 
                                                 
 183. See id. (identifying the ability to revoke licensures as the “most compelling” 
evidence of control). 
 184. See id. at 237 (denying Movielink’s motion for summary judgment). 
 185. 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 
 186. See id. at 833–34 (reviewing Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC 
LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d per curiam, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), and Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2008)). 
 187. See id. (highlighting the defendant’s supply of “javascript programs and html-
based web material” in Global Patent and the technical requirements for jukebox 
hardware manufacturers specific to the plaintiff’s jukebox system in Rowe as the 
alleged specific instructions). 
 188. See id. at 834 (contrasting the granting of summary judgment in Global Patent, 
where there was no contractual obligation for the third party to perform, with the 
jury finding of direction and control in Rowe, where the plaintiff provided specific 
technical requirements and directions for performance). 
 189. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 190. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“Infringement requires, as it always has, a showing that a defendant has practiced 
each and every element of the claimed invention.”), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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closely related to the “all limitations” rule and is used in direct 
infringement determinations.191  One commentator has asserted that 
the “single entity” or “single actor” rule is a corollary to the “all 
limitations” rule and that the “whoever” in the language of § 271 
refers to only a single, individual entity.192  Thus, under the “single 
entity” rule, “whoever” refers to only a single, individual entity for 
the purposes of direct infringement. 
Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and 
every step or element of a claimed method or product.193  Since direct 
infringement is a strict liability offense, a showing of intent or 
knowledge of the patent is not required.194  That is, under direct 
infringement, independent creation is not a defense and the 
infringement may be unintentional and inadvertent.195 
BMC held that indirect infringement (inducement and 
contributory infringement) requires a finding that a party amongst 
the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct 
infringement.196  Further, to succeed in an action for inducement or 
contributory infringement, BMC held that a plaintiff must first show 
that direct infringement under § 271(a) has occurred.197  In Akamai II 
                                                 
 191. See Joshua P. Larsen, Seminar Article, Liability for Divided Performance of Process 
Claims After BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 49–50 (2008) (examining the importance of the “all 
limitations” rule, which defined the scope of a patent by requiring the performance 
of each step to prove infringement). 
 192. See id. at 50–51 (arguing that the “single actor” and “all limitations” rules act 
as corollaries for direct infringement cases); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) 
(“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, . . . infringes the patent.”); BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378–79 (“Direct 
infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of a 
claimed method or product.  For process patent or method patent claims, 
infringement occurs when a party performs all of the steps of the process.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 193. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) 
(requiring an “objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis”); Joy Techs., Inc. v. 
Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that merely selling the 
equipment to perform the step in a process is insufficient to prove infringement and 
requiring the infringer to perform the process as well). 
 194. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17.  The 
infringer does not even have to know of the existence of the patent.  See id. (noting 
that knowledge may be considered as part of damages but not liability for 
infringement). 
 195. See Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) 
(emphasizing that independent design elements or modifications may show the 
infringer intended to avoid liability), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Blair v. Dowd’s, Inc. 438 
F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 196. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 197. Id. at 1380. 
ROBINSON.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED2 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:52 PM 
86 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:59 
the Federal Circuit overruled the portion of BMC that applied the 
“single entity” rule to the determination of infringement based on an 
inducement theory.198  However, it is important to note that the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Akamai II seems to have left the single 
entity rule intact with respect to direct infringement.199 
In formulating the “single entity” rule, the court in BMC relied on 
language in several cases that was not necessarily applicable to 
identifying a single infringer.200  For example, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.201 stands for the proposition that the 
doctrine of equivalents, like literal infringement, must be tested 
element by element.202  Courts have repeatedly held that a process 
claim is directly infringed when the process is performed.203  In 
Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc.,204 the court 
stated that the test of infringement is whether the claimed process is 
utilized by the infringer.205  Accordingly, none of these cases explicitly 
state that “a single entity” must perform each and every step of a 
claimed method to be a direct infringer. 
Further, in an attempt to weaken the “single entity” rule, one 
amici curiae in Akamai II asserted that the word “whoever” in § 271 
can mean more than one person.206  Statutory interpretation may 
indirectly support this definition.  Specifically, “whoever invents” 
refers to more than one inventor.207  Further, 1 U.S.C. § 1 states that 
words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, 
                                                 
 198. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1306. 
 199. Id. (stating that there can be liability for induced infringement where all the 
steps are not performed by a single entity). 
 200. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1378 (evaluating the facts under a looser standard and 
coming to the same conclusion). 
 201. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 202. Id. at 40 (“The determination of equivalence should be applied as an 
objective inquiry on an element-by-element basis.”). 
 203. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979); see Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The sale of 
the apparatus in Standard Havens was not a direct infringement because a method or 
process claim is directly infringed only when the process is performed.”); see also Atl. 
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that 
a defendant who did not manufacture a product could not infringe a product-by-
process claim). 
 204. 467 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 205. Id. at 427 (“To be a direct infringer of the method claims, defendant must be 
found to have used the attachments in question in the manner prescribed in the 
method claims.”). 
 206. Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (No. 2010-1291), 2011 WL 3101831, at *18–
19 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Neither Party] (arguing that “whoever” in § 271(a) 
must be able to mean more than one person). 
 207. See id. (asserting that 1 U.S.C. § 1 and common dictionary definitions strongly 
suggest that “whoever” must have a possible plural interpretation). 
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parties, or things.208  Accordingly, one could conclude that the word 
“whoever” should not be limited to mean a single entity.209 
Despite the “all elements” and “single entity” rules seemingly 
requiring the identification of a single infringer for direct 
infringement, courts have recognized that some form of joint 
infringement may occur and therefore joint liability should be 
assigned.  For example, the court in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener 
Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.210 stated that when patent infringement is 
brought about by a “concert of action,” all parties engaged directly 
and intentionally are joint infringers.211  In addition, several courts 
have recognized that joint liability may be imposed when 
infringement is the result of the participation and combined actions 
of defendants.212  Moreover, courts have held that infringement of a 
patented method cannot be avoided by defendants that have another 
party perform a step of the method.213 
C. An Attempt at Clarification Leads to Confusion 
Only a few years after Muniauction, the Federal Circuit heard two 
additional joint infringement cases.  In Akamai I, the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that the “direction or control” test must be read in the 
context of traditional agency law214 and that “direction, no matter 
how explicit,” is not an indicator of an agency relationship.215  The 
                                                 
 208. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 209. Amicus Brief for Neither Party, supra note 206, at *18 (“On its face, this 
statutory prohibition is directed to ‘whoever’ has engaged in infringing conduct and 
says nothing about whether such conduct is to be carried out by a single entity or a 
group of entities acting in concert with one another.”).  But see Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 
1347–48 (Linn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of the word “whoever” in the 
plural simply indicates that “[m]ore than one entity can be independently liable for 
direct patent infringement”). 
 210. 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). 
 211. Id. at 297. 
 212. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125, 1129 (N.D. 
Ill. 2003) (agreeing that the joint infringer theory is viable under § 271(a); 
McDermott v. Omid Int’l, 723 F. Supp. 1228, 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that 
the defendants are jointly liable when the infringement was the result of the 
“participation and combined actions of the defendants”), aff’d per curiam sub nom. 
McDermott v. Omid Int’l & Oriental Rug Supply House, Nos. 88-1592, 88-1593, 1989 
WL 72920 (Fed. Cir. July 6, 1989). 
 213. Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 667 
F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003, 
1004 (9th Cir. 1944) (“It is obvious that one may infringe a patent if he employ an 
agent for that purpose or have the offending articles manufactured for him by an 
independent contractor.”); Metal Film Co. v. Metlon Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 110 
n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“That defendants choose to have the vacuum metallizing, 
which was a conventional step . . . done by outside suppliers does not mitigate their 
infringement of the overall process.”). 
 214. Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 215. Id. at 1321. 
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Federal Circuit held in McKesson that the actions of one party could 
not be attributed to the accused infringer in the absence of an agency 
relationship or contractual obligation.216  However, a vigorous dissent 
in McKesson by Judge Newman was followed by the Federal Circuit 
granting a rehearing en banc in both cases.  The rehearing resulted 
in an opinion from a fractured Federal Circuit that did little to 
resolve some of the key issues and set up a potential review by the 
Supreme Court.217 
1. Akamai I 
In June 2006, Akamai Technologies, Inc. and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (collectively, “Akamai”) sued Limelight 
Networks, Inc. (Limelight) in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts for allegedly infringing three patents 
directed to Akamai’s content delivery network service.218  The district 
court granted judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), overturning a 
jury verdict of infringement by Limelight on claims 19-21 and 34 of 
U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 (the “‘703 patent”) and Akamai appealed 
to the Federal Circuit.219 
The technology central to the dispute involved a Content Delivery 
Network (“CDN”) made up of several computer systems.220  Both 
Akamai and Limelight offer CDN services to its customers.221  In 
addition, Akamai owns three patents disclosing a CDN system for 
allowing a content provider to outsource the storage and delivery of 
portions of its website content.222 
As described in the patents, the system delivers information over 
the Internet by placing its components in optimal geographic 
locations.223  The prior art systems store several copies of an entire 
website across different computers.224  In contrast, Akamai’s content 
delivery service replicates just the embedded objects of a website.225  
Akamai’s content delivery service separates the storage of these 
                                                 
 216. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1284 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 217. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1305–07.  A six judge majority issued a per curiam 
opinion while five judges dissented.  Even the dissenters were split four to one, which 
resulted in Judge Newman separately writing another vigorous dissent. 
 218. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1316. 
 219. Id. at 1314. 
 220. Id. at 1315. 
 221. Id. at 1316. 
 222. Id. at 1315. 
 223. Id. at 1315–16. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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embedded objects for a single website over several devices.226  A 
content provider’s computer stores the base document while a CDN 
stores individual embedded objects of the website.227  In order for a 
user to access the embedded objects, the URL of the embedded 
object must point to a CDN.228  Accordingly, the URL of the 
embedded objects must be modified by a “tagging” process so that it 
can be served by global hosting servers.229 
The Federal Circuit summarized Limelight’s implementation of its 
CDN service as follows: 
Limelight’s accused service delivers content providers’ embedded 
objects from its CDN.  According to Limelight’s contracts with its 
content provider customers, to use Limelight’s CDN service, the 
content provider must perform several steps.  First, the content 
provider must choose which embedded objects, if any, it would like 
to be served from Limelight’s CDN.  The content provider must 
then tag the URL of each chosen object as instructed by Limelight.  
Limelight then replicates the properly tagged objects on some or 
all of its servers and directs a user’s request for one of these objects 
to an appropriate Limelight server.230 
The two independent method claims asserted by Akamai at trial 
require “tagging” at least some embedded objects in a content 
provider’s web page such that requests for those objects resolve to a 
domain name other than the content provider’s domain name.231  
Claims 19 and 34 are reproduced below with emphasis on the 
“tagging” step: 
19.  A content delivery service, comprising: 
replicating a set of page objects across a wide area network of 
 content servers managed by a domain other than a content 
 provider domain; 
for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, tagging 
 the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the page objects 
 resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain; 
responsive to a request for the given page received at the content 
 provider domain, serving the given page from the content 
 provider domain; and 
                                                 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1315. 
 228. Id. at 1316. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
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serving at least one embedded object of the given page from a 
 given content server in the domain instead of from the content 
 provider domain.232 
34.  A content delivery method, comprising: 
distributing a set of page objects across a network of content servers 
 managed by a domain other than a content provider domain, 
 wherein the network of content servers are organized into a set 
 of regions; 
for a given page normally served from the content provider domain, tagging 
 at least some of the embedded objects of the page so that requests for the 
 objects resolve to the domain instead of the content provider domain; 
in response to a client request for an embedded object of the page: 
 resolving the client request as a function of a location of the 
 client machine making the request and current Internet traffic 
 conditions to identify a given region; and 
returning to the client an IP address of a given one of the content 
 servers within the given region that is likely to host the 
 embedded object and that is not overloaded.233 
An important point, which was not in dispute by the parties, was 
that Limelight did not perform every step of claims 19 or 34.234  That 
is, Limelight did not perform the emphasized tagging steps.235  
Instead, Limelight provided the information necessary to its 
customers (content providers) so that they could perform the tagging 
steps themselves.236 
At trial, Akamai relied on a theory of joint liability and asserted that 
Limelight directed or controlled its customers to perform the 
“tagging” step in both method claims.237  After a finding of 
infringement, Limelight moved for a JMOL that it did not infringe 
the asserted method claims.238  Relying on the decision in 
Muniauction, the district court granted the JMOL on the grounds that 
there was “no material difference between Limelight’s interaction 
with its customers and that of Thompson [sic] in Muniauction.”239  On 
appeal, Akamai argued that the evidence presented at trial supported 
                                                 
 232. U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703 col. 19 ll. 6–20 (filed May 19, 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 233. Id. col. 20 ll. 32–52 (emphasis added). 
 234. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1317. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1318. 
 239. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 122–23 
(D. Mass. 2009), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311, rev’d en banc, per curiam, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
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a jury determination that Limelight exercises control or direction 
over the claimed methods.240 
The Federal Circuit summarized Akamai’s arguments as follows: 
Limelight:  (1) creates and assigns a unique hostname for the 
content provider; (2) provides explicit step-by-step instructions to 
perform the tagging and serving claim steps; (3) offers technical 
assistance to help content providers with their performance of the 
claim steps; and (4) contractually requires content providers to 
perform the tagging and serving claim steps if they utilize the 
Limelight service.241 
In response, Limelight argued that these facts were 
“indistinguishable” from those found in Muniauction and that the 
JMOL should be affirmed.242 
In Akamai I, the Federal Circuit began its analysis by summarizing 
its findings in BMC and Muniauction.243  The court stated that “direct 
infringement requires a single party to perform every step of a 
claimed method.”244  If more than one party is required to perform 
the claimed method, there is “no infringement unless ‘one party 
exercises “control or direction” over the entire process such that 
every step is attributable to the controlling party.’”245  The Federal 
Circuit explained that its holding in Muniauction clarified that “the 
requisite level of control or direction over the acts committed by a 
third party is met in circumstances in which ‘the law would 
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for 
the acts committed by another party.’” 246 
Here, the Federal Circuit went on to explain that it is essential to 
determine whether the acts of one party may be attributed to the 
other.247  The court clarified that “the performance of a method step 
may be attributed to an accused infringer when the relationship 
between the accused infringer and another party performing a 
method step is that of principal and agent,” or “that joint 
infringement occurs when a party is contractually obligated to the 
                                                 
 240. Akamai I, 629 F.3d at 1318. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 1318–19. 
 244. Id. at 1318 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–
79 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301). 
 245. Id. at 1318–19 (quoting Muniauction, Inc v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301). 
 246. Id. at 1319 (quoting Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330) (explaining that in 
Muniauction, the instructions given by the defendant to its product users were not 
sufficient to meet the “control or direction” test). 
 247. Id. 
ROBINSON.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED2 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2012  12:52 PM 
92 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:59 
accused infringer to perform a method step.”248  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit held that there could only be joint infringement in 
two cases:  (1) “when there is an agency relationship between the 
parties who perform the method steps,” or (2) “when one party is 
contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”249  
Analyzing the facts, the Federal Circuit stated that there were neither 
facts that indicated Limelight’s customers performed the steps of the 
claimed method as Limelight’s agents nor a contractual obligation to 
perform the method steps.250 
In response to Akamai’s argument that the word “direct” in the 
“direction or control” test must mean something other than 
“control,” the court stated that the “direction or control” test “must 
be read in the context of traditional agency law.”251  Based on that 
pronouncement, the court then stated that “there is no indication 
that an agency relationship arises when one party simply provides 
direction, no matter how explicit, to another party.”252 
The court also decided that the facts were insufficient to find that 
Limelight’s customers were contractually obligated to Limelight.253  
Limelight’s form contract with its customers does not obligate them 
to perform any of the method steps; instead it simply explains what 
the customers must do to take advantage of Limelight’s services.254  
Accordingly, because Limelight did not perform the “tag” step of the 
asserted method claims and the record contained no evidence that 
Limelight controlled its customers’ “tagging” the content, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of non-infringement.255 
On April 20, 2011, the Federal Circuit decided that Akamai I 
warranted en banc reconsideration.256  Both parties were requested to 
file briefs addressing the following issue:  “If separate entities each 
perform separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances 
would that claim be directly infringed and to what extent would each 
of the parties be liable?”257  The Federal Circuit would follow a similar 
path in McKesson. 
                                                 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 1320. 
 250. See id. at 1320–21 (holding that Limelight’s control over customers was 
similar to the relationship in Muniauction and that therefore there was no agency). 
 251. Id. at 1320. 
 252. Id. at 1321. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 1314, 1322. 
 256. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 257. Id. 
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2. McKesson 
The technology at issue in McKesson was also Internet-based.258  
Specifically, the patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 or “the ‘898 
patent,” relates to a method for a patient and healthcare provider to 
share information with each other via the Internet.259 
Epic Systems Corporation (Epic), a software development 
company, licensed its “MyChart” software to healthcare providers.260  
In turn, healthcare providers provided MyChart software to their 
patients as an option.261  The MyChart software allows healthcare 
providers to associate medical records with a patient webpage.262  In 
addition, patients can use MyChart to communicate with healthcare 
providers online.263  In order for a patient to use the MyChart 
software, the patient must “initiate a communication” to the 
provider, i.e., log on to a healthcare provider’s MyChart page.264 
McKesson, the owner of the ‘898 patent, sued Epic in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging 
that Epic induced infringement of the ‘898 patent by licensing its 
MyChart software to healthcare providers.265 
Claim 1 of the ‘898 patent is representative of the claims asserted 
against Epic.  The initiating step, performed by the patient is 
highlighted below: 
 1.  A method of automatically and electronically communicating 
between at least one health-care provider and a plurality of users 
serviced by the health-care provider, said method comprising the 
steps of: 
 initiating a communication by one of the plurality of users to the provider 
  for information, wherein the provider has established a preexisting  
  medical record for each user; 
 enabling communication by transporting the communication  
 through a provider/patient interface. . .; 
 electronically comparing content of the communication . . .; 
                                                 
 258. McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-2965-JTC, 2009 
WL 2915778, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2009), aff’d sub nom. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. 
Epic Sys. Corp. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, per curiam 
sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 259. Id. at *1. 
 260. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 1:06-CV-2965-JTC, 2009 
WL 2915778, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2009), aff’d sub nom. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. 
Epic Sys. Corp. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, rev’d en banc, per curiam sub nom. Akamai 
II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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 returning the response to the communication automatically . . .; 
 said provider/patient interface providing a fully automated 
 mechanism for generating a personalized page or area within 
 the provider’s Web site for each user serviced by the provider; 
 and 
 said patient-provider interface service center for dynamically 
 assembling and delivering customer content to said user.266 
Similar to Akamai I, the parties did not dispute that Epic’s MyChart 
software did not perform each step of the method.267  Accordingly, on 
the issue of joint infringement, Epic argued in a motion for summary 
judgment and a renewed motion for summary judgment that Epic’s 
customer’s (the healthcare providers) neither performed the 
“initiating a communication” step nor exercised “direction or 
control” over the party that performs the “initiating” step.268  The 
district court agreed with Epic and granted its renewed motion for 
summary judgment.269 
McKesson appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.270  On 
appeal, the court noted that McKesson alleged induced 
infringement, which, according to the court at that time required a 
showing that a single entity committed the act of infringement.271  
The Federal Circuit framed the issue as “whether the relationship 
between Epic’s customers (MyChart providers) and the MyChart 
users is such that performance of the ‘initiating a communication’ 
step may be attributed to the MyChart providers.”272 
The court summarized its previous decisions in BMC and 
Muniauction and further elaborated on its decision in Akamai I.273  
Accordingly, McKesson summarizes the Federal Circuit’s previous 
holdings concerning joint infringement as follows:  (1) “where the 
actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a 
claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party 
exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire process such that every 
step is attributable to the controlling party,”274 (2) “[t]he ‘control or 
                                                 
 266. U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898 col. 44 l. 60–col. 45 l. 24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 267. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282. 
 268. Id. at 1283. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id.; see discussion supra Part I.B.4 
 272. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283. 
 273. Id. at 1283–84. 
 274. Id. at 1283 (quoting Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
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direction’ standard is satisfied in situations where the law would 
traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for 
the acts committed by another party that are required to complete 
performance of a claimed method,”275 and (3) “there can only be 
joint infringement when there is an agency relationship between the 
parties who perform the method steps or when one party is 
contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.”276 
The parties and the court focused their arguments on the 
relationship between the doctors and patients using the MyChart 
software.277  McKesson essentially argued that a relationship less than 
agency would satisfy the “direction or control” test by arguing that a 
doctor–patient relationship was sufficient for a finding of 
attribution.278  In response, applying the test under Akamai I, the 
Federal Circuit found that a doctor-patient relationship was not an 
agency relationship or a contractual obligation.279  The court 
concluded that the actions of MyChart users could not be attributed 
to Epic’s customers (the healthcare providers) without an agency 
relationship or contractual obligation, and thus, McKesson failed to 
demonstrate that a single party directly infringed the ‘898 patent.280 
In response to McKesson’s arguments, the court repeated its 
statement in BMC that “expanding the rules governing direct 
infringement to reach independent conduct of multiple actors would 
subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement.”281  The court 
elaborated that the “single harm” of direct patent infringement was 
limited to those who practiced each and every element of the 
invention and that absent direct infringement, the patentee has not 
suffered compensable harm.282 
                                                 
 275. Id. at 1283 (quoting Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330). 
 276. Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 
692 F.3d 1301). 
 277. See id. at 1284 (discussing whether a doctor-patient relationship alone gives 
rise to either an agency relationship between the parties or a contractual obligation 
on the patients). 
 278. See id. (explaining that McKesson argued that the doctor-patient relationship 
is more than a mere arms-length relationship, and instead is more analogous to an 
agency relationship because “[t]he phrase ‘doctor’s orders’ says it all” and because 
of “doctor-patient privilege”). 
 279. See id. (opining that MyChart users only acted for their own benefit and were 
not under the MyChart providers’ control). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. (quoting BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301). 
 282. Id. at 1285; cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913, 930 (2005) (stating “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or 
encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it” (citation 
omitted)). 
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Judge Bryson concurred with the decision based on the precedents 
set forth in BMC and Akamai I but suggested en banc review.283  
Conversely, Judge Newman issued a vigorous dissent and framed the 
decision as an attack on all interactive methods and their underlying 
technologies.284  Soon thereafter, the Federal Circuit decided that 
McKesson warranted an en banc rehearing.285 
3. McKesson dissent and questions posed by the Federal Circuit 
Judge Newman’s dissent in McKesson highlights two issues with the 
majority opinion.  First, Judge Newman asserts that the decision in 
McKesson does not follow earlier panel precedent.286  Judge Newman 
categorizes the rulings in several previous joint infringement cases as 
inconsistent, stating that “[p]anels of this court distinguishing 
between practice of an element of a system, and practice of an 
element of a method, does not add clarity or predictability to patent 
law.”287  Further, Judge Newman notes that previous panels of the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have held that there can be 
infringement liability when steps of a claimed method are performed 
by different entities.288  With respect to the agency or contractual 
obligation test set forth in Akamai I, Judge Newman asserts that there 
is no such rule of law.289 
Judge Newman argues that by upholding the notion that “neither 
collaboration nor joint action nor facilitation nor authorization nor 
invitation can overcome the immutable barrier to infringement when 
all of the participating entities are not under the ‘control or 
direction’ of a mastermind infringer,” the court eliminates the patent 
incentive for interactive procedures and “disserves commerce, 
fairness, and the innovation incentive.”290  Thus, Judge Newman 
                                                 
 283. McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 284. See id. at 1291 (Newman, J., dissenting) (affirming that this case was not an 
effort to broaden the scope of patent rights, and claiming that the majority’s decision 
removes all interactive methods from patent eligibility). 
 285. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam) (granting McKesson’s petition for rehearing en banc). 
 286. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288–89 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(questioning the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of precedent, which resulted in the 
“single-entity rule” of infringement being held as an absolute rule of law). 
 287. Id. at 1290. 
 288. Id. at 1286. 
 289. See id. at 1290 (describing the Akamai rule as a version of “aberrant 
holdings”). 
 290. See id. at 1285–86 (stating that the decision, therefore, leaves interactive 
methods more susceptible to infringement). 
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concludes that a patent that cannot be infringed does not provide the 
patentee with a right to exclude and therefore is not a patent at all.291 
4. Akamai II 
The Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Akamai II on August 31, 
2012.  The opinion failed to answer many of the questions the 
Federal Circuit asked the parties to brief.  In issuing its opinion, the 
majority acknowledged that doctrinal problems arise “when the acts 
necessary to give rise to liability for direct infringement are shared 
between two or more actors.”292  However, the majority passed on the 
opportunity to clarify the law of joint infringement as it applied to 
liability for direct infringement under § 271(a).293  Instead, the court 
overruled its decisions in BMC and Muniauction and established a new 
test under inducement for when more than one party performs steps 
in a method claim.294  Judges in the minority issued two dissenting 
opinions.  In one dissent, Judge Newman, writing for herself, argued 
that there should be liability for infringement whenever one or more 
parties perform the steps of a claimed method.295  In the second 
dissent, Judge Linn, joined by three other judges, argued for the 
preservation of the direction or control test and asserted that the test 
provides for a finding of liability where there is a joint enterprise.296 
The majority held that there can be liability for induced 
infringement where all the steps are not performed by a single 
entity.297  Because inducement does not require the induced party to 
be an agent of the inducer or under the direction or control of the 
inducer, the effect of the majority’s opinion is to eliminate the 
“control or direction” test established and elaborated upon in BMC 
and Muniauction.  Relying on the House Report on the 1952 Act, the 
majority reasoned that inducement applies to joint infringement 
cases because one who aids or abets infringement is “likewise an 
infringer.”298  In support of its inducement only rule, the majority also 
explained that an inducer has the same impact on the patentee 
whether he induces one party or multiple parties to infringe.299 
In contrast, Judge Linn’s dissent argued that inducement of a 
                                                 
 291. See id. at 1291 (“A patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of 
infringement, is not a statutory patent right.”). 
 292. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 293. Id. at 1305–06. 
 294. Id. at 1306. 
 295. Id. at 1336 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 296. Id. at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 297. Id. at 1306 (majority opinion). 
 298. Id. at 1309 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952)). 
 299. Id. at 1308–09. 
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partial act that is not itself infringement is not inducement of any 
prohibited conduct under the act.300  Instead, the dissent relied on 
the Supreme Court’s statement in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible 
Top Replacement Co.301 that, “it is settled that if there is no direct 
infringement of a patent there can be no contributory infringement” 
to reject the majority’s new position.302  Thus, in addition to 
upholding the “control or direction” test, the dissent would have also 
expanded it to hold: 
“[D]irect infringement is required to support infringement under 
§ 271(b) or § 271(c) and properly exists only where one party 
performs each and every claim limitation or is vicariously liable for 
the acts of others in completing any steps of a method claim, such 
as when one party directs or controls another in a principal-agent 
relationship or like contractual relationship, or participates in a joint 
enterprise to practice each and every limitation of the claim.”303 
The dissent explained that a joint enterprise exists when there is: 
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the 
group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a 
community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the 
members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the 
enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.”304 
The dissent’s expansion of the “control or direction” test to 
include a joint enterprise leads to a curious result.  Based on this 
approach, the dissent claims that the decision in Golden Hour, where 
two parties each performed separate steps of a claimed method for 
their mutual benefit, should be overturned.305  However, the dissent 
would affirm both decisions in Akamai I and McKesson because even 
under its new joint enterprise theory, the customer in both cases 
would not be considered to be in a joint enterprise with the service or 
product provider.306  Finally, the dissent also reiterated arguments 
from BMC and other commentators that proper claim drafting can 
                                                 
 300. Id. at 1346–47 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 301. 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961). 
 302. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1340 (Linn, J., dissenting) (quoting Aro, 365 U.S. at 
341). 
 303. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added). 
 304. Id. at 1349 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 491 cmt. c. (1965)). 
 305. Id.; see Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (reiterating that, at trial, the jury found 
that two companies, emsCharts and Softech enabled their respective programs to 
work together such that their combined system, which they sold as a package, met all 
the limitations of several of the asserted claims). 
 306. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1350–51 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
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usually be used to avoid the issue of joint infringement and capture 
infringement by a single party.307 
In her dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority’s new rule 
creates new problems for enforcement and compensation as well as 
“new opportunities for gamesmanship and abuse and inequity.”308  
For example, Judge Newman argued that the court shifted the sole 
focus to that of the alleged inducer who would be solely liable if all 
the elements of inducement were proven.309  Finally, instead of 
inducement-only or the “control or direction” test, Judge Newman 
argued that infringement occurs when all of the claimed steps are 
performed without regard to how many parties are involved or their 
relationship.310 
In sum, both dissents harshly criticize the majority for making new 
policy and being a product of spontaneous judicial creation.311  
Further, instead of addressing the issue of joint liability for direct 
infringement, the court replaced one narrow test with another that 
could create opportunities for gamesmanship and abuse.312 
II. RATIONALE FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH 
A. Overview 
The newly minted inducement-only rule and the dissents’ 
proposed tests for joint infringement are unsatisfactory for a number 
of reasons.  The Patent Act of 1952 codified the case law concerning 
indirect infringement.313  However, most of the technology that is the 
subject of current joint infringement cases did not exist in 1952.314  
Accordingly, the statute does not reflect (1) an understanding of 
issues that might arise with new technologies and (2) the ways in 
                                                 
 307. Id. at 1349. 
 308. Id. at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 309. Id. at 1320. 
 310. Id. at 1323 (“Infringement is not a question of how many people it takes to 
perform a patented method.”). 
 311. Id. at 1320; id. at 1337 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 312. Id. at 1320 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 313. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006); see also supra notes 55–56 and 
accompanying text. 
 314. The World Wide Web and the Internet were first proposed by Tim Berners-
Lee in 1989.  See TIM BERNERS-LEE, CERN, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT:  A PROPOSAL 
(1989), available at http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html (introducing 
the concept of “linked information systems”). 
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which multiple entities working in concert could infringe patents to 
these new technologies.315 
Further, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that a rule based 
solely on the relationship between relevant actors creates a legal 
loophole.316  This loophole is a roadmap for perceptive entities, 
allowing them to reap the benefit of a patent that cannot be 
enforced.317  In her dissent in McKesson, Judge Newman stated, “[a] 
patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of infringement, is not 
a statutory patent right.”318  Further, Judge Newman seems to fear 
that rendering valid interactive method claims unenforceable will 
discourage “information-age” companies from seeking patent 
protection and as a result, stifle innovation.319  This outcome is 
directly in conflict with the constitutional mandate that Congress 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”320  However, 
Judge Newman’s proposal that direct infringement occurs when all 
the claimed steps are performed without regard to any circumstances 
surrounding the alleged infringement would ensnare innocent actors 
and once caught would place an undue burden on the courts to cut 
them free.321 
Accordingly, a more flexible approach must be implemented in 
order to produce consistent and fair legal results.  In the wake of 
Akamai II, the Federal Circuit eliminated the “direction or control” 
test and established an inducement-only rule.322  Nevertheless, the law 
should carefully expand the test for joint infringement beyond 
                                                 
 315. See discussion supra Part I (describing how courts have struggled to find 
consensus for the novel problems presented by new technologies involving multiple 
actors). 
 316. See infra Part II.C.1 (suggesting that parties could enter into arms-length 
agreements to avoid infringement under the control or direction standard). 
 317. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(downplaying concerns over infringement-avoidance by stating that “arms-length 
cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim drafting”), overruled by Akamai II, 
692 F.3d 1301. 
 318. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1291 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 319. See id. at 1286 (arguing that the court’s decision “eliminates the patent 
incentive from such interactive procedures,” leaving these types of methods 
vulnerable to infringement and enlarges inconsistent precedent that could deter 
innovation). 
 320. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 321. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1350 (Linn, J., dissenting) (describing Judge 
Newman’s approach as permitting “joint actor infringement liability whenever 
independent parties collectively infringe a patent”). 
 322. See id. at 1306 (concluding that direction or control test interpretation of 
section 271(b) “is wrong as a matter of statutory construction, precedent, and sound 
patent policy”). 
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focusing solely on inducement or the relationship between relevant 
actors. 
There are several reasons to create a flexible approach to joint 
infringement.  Congress could not take into account existing 
interactive technology when it drafted the current statutory 
provisions concerning contributory and indirect infringement.323  
Second, absent a showing of inducement, the current Federal Circuit 
test creates a loophole in the law.324  In addition, the Supreme Court 
has recently rejected tests established by the Federal Circuit for 
various reasons.325  Furthermore, laws that allow for broader 
enforcement of interactive method claims would place U.S. law on 
par with the laws in other prominent countries.326  Finally, as the 
world becomes increasingly interconnected, a more flexible 
enforcement mechanism may encourage further innovation. 
B. The Limitations of § 271 
Section 271 does not equip the judiciary to properly handle the 
joint infringement fact patterns of the Information Age.  The Patent 
Act of 1952 codified the pre-1952 common law concerning indirect 
infringement.327  The case law recognized that an action for 
infringement should lie when more than one party contributed to 
the infringement of a patent claim.328  However, the common law was 
developed from cases concerning industrial age technologies.329  
Thus, the interactive methods and the capability to carry out 
                                                 
 323. The Patent Act of 1952, which codified rules on indirect infringement, was 
drafted prior to the creation of the Internet and its associated technologies.  See 
BERNERS-LEE, supra note 314 (introducing the concept of the Internet in 1989).  But 
see Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1343 (Linn, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress recently 
had the opportunity to modify the statute but chose not to do so). 
 324. See infra Part II.C.1 (suggesting that parties could enter into arms-length 
agreements to avoid infringement under the control or direction standard); see also 
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(acknowledging that the current law creates a loophole but asserting that the law 
imposes vicarious liability on any party that can be shown to have controlled the 
actions of the infringing actor), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 325. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of Federal 
Circuit tests). 
 326. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 327. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (explaining that the purpose of § 271 
in the Patent Act of 1952 was to codify principles of contributory infringement and 
clarify its scope). 
 328. See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100) 
(finding that the defendant was guilty of copyright infringement despite the fact that 
the defendant used only part of a patented system because the defendant knew third 
parties would provide the patented system’s additional parts and the defendant, 
therefore, was a joint infringer of the complainant’s patent). 
 329. See, e.g., id. at 75 (depicting the patent at issue in the case as an oil lamp). 
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interactive processes that are the subject of recent joint infringement 
cases did not exist before 1952.330 
The language of the statute is additionally limited by its narrow 
interpretation, as reflected in the Federal Circuit’s “single entity” 
rule.331  According to the “single entity” rule, “whoever” in § 271 
refers to only a single entity.332  In contrast, one commentator has 
stated that the focus of direct infringement should be upon a single 
act, not a single actor.333  That is, the court should determine whether 
one single act of infringement has occurred when the acts of 
individuals are considered as a whole.334  At this stage, the single entity 
rule remains intact with respect to infringement under § 271(a), 
although there seems to be sufficient rationale to eliminate it.335  
Legislative clarification would be the simplest and most desirable 
solution. 
Unfortunately, Congress missed an excellent opportunity to clarify 
the law.  Specifically, the America Invents Act336 did nothing to resolve 
the issues raised in Akamai I or McKesson.337  However, Congress did 
pass some provisions that indicate that it is well aware of the overall 
controversy surrounding method claims; for example, the 
                                                 
 330. See BERNERS-LEE, supra note 314 (suggesting the idea for the World Wide Web 
and writing its code in 1989).  But see Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (explaining that Judge Giles J. Rich foreshadowed 
enforcement problems with method claims involving a radio transmitter and 
receiver). 
 331. McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1282 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the finding of “noninfringement” based on the 
complainant’s failure to attribute the infringement to a single party), rev’d sub nom. 
Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 332. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 50–51 (explaining that the court in BMC 
applied the “Single Actor” rule and refused to aggregate the actions of various 
actors). 
 333. See Naoki Mizutani, SOFTIC Special Researcher , Remarks at Panel on Patent 
Infringement Suits in Global Network Age, SOFTIC Symposium 2001:  Information 
Distribution and Legal Protection in Cyberspace—In Search of a New System 83 
(Nov. 21, 2001), available at http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/records/SOFTIC_ 
10%82%94h_proceedings.pdf (arguing that patent infringement can exist even 
when a plurality of persons is involved). 
 334. See id. (recommending that attorneys avoid the single entity rule by framing 
infringement claims in terms of a single infringer). 
 335. See discussion supra Part I.B.4. 
 336. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.). 
 337. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(Linn, J., dissenting) (asserting that if Congress took issue with the court’s 
interpretation of § 271(a), (b) and (c) in BMC and Muniauction, it would have 
amended the statute in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act).  The Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act provided major reforms to the U.S. patent system, switching the 
system from a “first to invent” to a “first inventor to file” and implementing myriad 
additional changes.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(o)–(p).  The Act, 
however, does not address the issue of joint infringement. 
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“Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents” 
provides for a special procedure in which an accused infringer can 
challenge the validity of a business method patent covering a process 
related to a financial product or service.338  While this provision could 
increase the difficulty in obtaining a patent on business methods, it 
does not foreclose interactive method patents nor does it advocate 
for a system in which patents granted to interactive method 
inventions can only be enforced in an inducement context.339 
C. The Limitations of the Judiciary 
1. A judicially created loophole 
There is no clear example of facts that would pass muster under 
the majority’s inducement-only test.  At the district court level, only a 
handful of cases in which joint infringement was asserted survived 
summary judgment.  For example, in Movielink, evidence that an 
alleged infringer exercised continuing control in a distributed system 
was sufficient to support a claim for infringement under the direction 
or control test.340  In another example, the court in Emtel, Inc. v. 
LipidLabs, Inc. stated that evidence of an alleged infringer causing 
third parties to perform in accordance with specific instructions and 
requirements was sufficient to support a claim for joint 
infringement.341  Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not reviewed 
the aforementioned cases.  Further, the Federal Circuit remanded 
both Akamai II and McKesson for further proceedings on the theory of 
induced infringement.342 
In BMC and subsequent Federal Circuit cases, the court 
acknowledged that a loophole in the law exists.343  This loophole now 
                                                 
 338. Id. § 18. 
 339. See generally Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Aristocrat Technologies Australia 
Pty Ltd. & Aristocrat Technologies, Inc. in Support of Appellants Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. & the Massachusetts Institute of Technology & Supporting 
Reversal, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (Nos. 
2009-1372, -1380, -1417), 2011 WL 3101891 [hereinafter Corrected Brief of Amici 
Curiae]. 
 340. See id. at 236 (finding that summary judgment was not warranted because the 
complainant was able to provide sufficient evidence to support its assertion that the 
respondent retains sufficient control over software running on customers’ computers 
so as to still be held liable as a direct infringer). 
 341. See Emtel, Inc. v. Lipidlabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 839–40 (S.D. Tex. 
2008) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the relationship 
between the defendant and third party was too tenuous and did not rise to the level 
where the defendant could be held vicariously liable for the third party’s 
performance). 
 342. Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1319. 
 343. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(acknowledging the existence of the loophole but asserting that related concerns are 
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allows two or more parties to infringe method patents absent a 
showing that one party induced the other to infringe.344  
Unfortunately, no patentee has had the opportunity to present 
evidence to successfully satisfy the Federal Circuit’s new inducement-
only test.  While this is by no means proof of an incorrect test, it is 
nevertheless an important data point especially in view of recent 
Supreme Court decisions that have struck down Federal Circuit 
tests.345 
2. Supreme Court rejection of Federal Circuit tests 
The Supreme Court has suggested that several of the tests 
developed by the Federal Circuit are too restrictive.346  For example, 
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,347 the Supreme Court found 
that the Federal Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion or motivation” test 
(“TSM”) was not supported by its precedent interpreting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103, the statute governing obviousness.348  In striking down the TSM 
test, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language broadly.349 
Similarly, in Bilski v. Kappos,350 the Supreme Court indicated that 
the Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation” test for patentable 
subject matter was useful but not dispositive as to whether an 
invention was patentable.351  Instead of relying solely on the machine 
or transformation test to determine patent eligibility, the Court 
referred to its earlier precedent that interpreted the patent eligibility 
statute more broadly.352  Accordingly, the Supreme Court made clear 
                                                 
less problematic than the concerns that could arise if the rules for direct 
infringement were broadened), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 344. Id. (stating that only a defendant who served as a “mastermind” and either 
controlled or directed another entity would warrant a finding of joint infringement). 
 345. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of Federal 
Circuit tests). 
 346. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). 
 347. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 348. Id. at 419 (declaring that the Federal Circuit’s TSM test is inconsistent with 
prior Supreme Court cases because it is overly rigid). 
 349. See id. at 415 (“We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of 
Appeals.  Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our 
cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the 
Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.”). 
 350. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 351. See id. at 3226–27 (declaring that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded 
that the Supreme Court had endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as an 
exclusive or exhaustive test). 
 352. See id. (recognizing precedent that held that process patents could qualify if 
they did not meet machine or transformation requirements for patentability (citing 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978))); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 
(1972). 
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in Bilski that method claims directed to “information age” 
innovations were eligible for patent protection.353 
Thus, over the last several years a trend has developed where the 
Supreme Court strikes down rigid rules established by the Federal 
Circuit in favor of more open ended and flexible standards.354  One 
article has observed that the Supreme Court prefers open-ended 
judicial inquiries that closely adhere to the language and purpose of 
the statute.355  Further, the Supreme Court has said that when 
technological change has rendered the literal terms of an act 
ambiguous, the act should be construed in light of its basic 
purposes.356  Given that the language of the statue is not as helpful in 
the case of interactive methods, further consideration should be 
given to policy arguments in favor of enforcement of interactive 
method claims.357 
D. Claim Drafting 
In acknowledgement of the statutory language and judicial 
loophole, the Federal Circuit and several commentators have said 
that patentees can avoid joint infringement issues by drafting claims 
directed to a single infringer.358  Moreover, the Federal Circuit has 
said that it will not rewrite or correct poorly drafted claims.359  
However, drafting so-called better claims directed to a single 
infringer is not a cure-all.  Some patents are by their nature 
                                                 
 353. Id. at 3227 (suggesting the machine or transformation test may be 
inappropriate in the Information Age because it would call into question the 
patentability of myriad high-tech products). 
 354. See Gregory A. Castanias et al., 2010 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit:  
The Advent of “The Rader Court,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 857 (2011) (describing various 
examples of the dichotomy between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in 
the patent context). 
 355. See id. at 856–57 (describing these principles as lessons that can be learned 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski). 
 356. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(providing that the Copyright Act must be interpreted so as to retain its fundamental 
purpose when technological changes have “rendered its literal terms ambiguous”). 
 357. See Bilski 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (describing the problems of applying § 101’s 
patent eligibility principles to modern technology in the advent of the Information 
Age). 
 358. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(stating that “[a] patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a 
single party”), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per 
curiam); see also Lemley et al., supra note 33, at 272 (“Most inventions that involve 
cooperation of multiple entities can be covered using claims drafted in unitary form 
simply by focusing on one entity and whether it supplies or receives any given 
element.”). 
 359. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (explaining that the plaintiff could have drafted its 
claims so as to focus on only one entity, but that the court will not change the claim 
so as to remedy the error). 
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interactive, and in order to properly claim the invention, the claims 
must be directed to or mention more than a single actor.360  The 
effect of a rigid rule that relies on the existence of inducement is that 
it renders many patents directed to interactive technologies 
unenforceable.361  A more desirable standard for determining joint 
infringement liability would prevent interactive patents from being 
completely unenforceable and simultaneously support the Federal 
Circuit’s position for placing the burden on the applicant to draft 
clearer claims. 
E. International Approaches 
A more flexible joint infringement standard would put the United 
States on par with other countries.  Interactive method patents in 
some prominent countries enjoy a lower hurdle to enforcement than 
their U.S. counterparts.362  This lower standard allows patentees in 
these countries to recover against an entity that commercially benefits 
from the invention without performing each step.363  Given the 
growing importance of international patents to the top American 
innovators,364 it is instructive to examine how other countries have 
addressed the problem of joint infringement. 
Under a “partial infringement” theory, several European countries 
subject an entity to liability when that entity has practiced the 
substance of the invention.365  That is, even if the accused infringer 
omitted a nominal step, it may be liable for infringement.366  
                                                 
 360. See Lee, supra note 39, at 349 (explaining that patentability of Internet 
patents may lie in the combination of various steps). 
 361. See, e.g., BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (refusing to find infringement because there 
was no evidence of direct control).  Armed only with unenforceable patents, 
patentees cannot prevent others from making, using, or selling their invention.  If 
patentees’ ability to prevent others from exploiting the patentees’ technology is 
extinguished, it is reasonable that certain business sectors may stop filing 
applications. 
 362. See Jochen Pagenberg, The Scope of Art. 69 European Patent Convention:  Should 
Sub-Combinations Be Protected?—A Comparative Analysis on the Basis of French and German 
Law, 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 314, 315–16 (1993) (requiring 
infringement of the core of the invention, but not necessarily every step). 
 363. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 59–60 (construing partial infringement as 
allowing recovery for claims that would be otherwise barred in the United States). 
 364. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL PATENT PROTECTIONS 
FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 4 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_ 
implementation/20120113-ippr_report.pdf (claiming that innovators in the 
American economy need patent protection, especially when deciding upon cross-
border transactions). 
 365. See Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 30, 
1989, O.J. L 401, art. 26; see also 5 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:14, at 
15-83 to -84 (4th ed. 2011). 
 366. See MOY, supra note 365, § 15:14, at 15-84. 
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Accordingly, an accused infringer could not escape liability by simply 
arguing that it did not perform one of several method steps.  Further, 
the “partial infringement” theory seems to not consider any 
relationship with another party that may have performed some steps 
of the asserted method.367 
Other foreign theories focus on the actions and roles of the 
multiple infringing parties.  For example, British law requires a 
showing that the infringing acts of more than one party were carried 
out “pursuant to a common design.” 368  Further, Japan adheres to an 
instrumentalist theory where infringement can be found if the 
conduct of one actor is used as an instrument by another actor.369  To 
protect innocent actors from liability in Japan, however, a consumer 
is not liable for infringement for private use of a claimed method or 
process.370  That is, liability will lie only when the consumer makes 
commercial use of the method or process.371 
While the “partial infringement” theory would be inconsistent with 
U.S. law, specifically the “all elements” rule,372 the more important 
point is that there are flexible options for enforcement of interactive 
method patents in at least Europe and Japan.  In contrast, U.S. 
patentees must attempt to draft claims that meet the “single entity” 
rule.373  Alternatively, U.S. patentees must show at trial that one actor 
induced another actor to infringe the patent.374  Consequently, 
Europe and Japan may be more favorable venues for claimants 
wishing to enforce interactive inventions. 
F. Resistance To Change 
One argument that was used in support of the direction or control 
test is that it shields innocent actors from the harsh results of strict 
liability for patent infringement.375  Commentators have warned that 
                                                 
 367. Id. § 15:14, at 15-84 to -85. 
 368. See Sabaf SpA v. MFI Furniture Ctrs. Ltd., [2004] UKHL 45, [39] (appeal 
taken from Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/45.pdf. 
 369. See Electrodeposited Image Case, 1764 HANREI JIHO 112 (Tokyo D. Ct., 
Sept. 20, 2001). 
 370. Mizutani, supra note 333, at 89–90 (distinguishing between private and 
commercial use). 
 371. Id. at 90. 
 372. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 60. 
 373. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(requiring the infringer to perform all steps), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 374. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1319 (agreeing that induced infringement is a 
viable alternative to the use of the “single entity” rule). 
 375. See Lemley, supra note 33, at 262 (concluding that construing patent laws to 
permit individual, non-infringing acts of unrelated parties to add up to infringement 
renders the law meaningless). 
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broader rules for determining joint infringement liability will ensnare 
innocent actors.376  This is a reasonable concern as these innocent 
actors are generally customers of an alleged infringing service and 
typically perform only one step in the allegedly infringed claim.377 
The law could easily exempt innocent actors from liability,378 
though, innocent actors were rarely involved in the cases that have 
been litigated.  Instead, the parties involved in the joint infringement 
are usually sophisticated businesses.379  Accordingly, a flexible test that 
exempts innocent actors from liability, but still prevents 
misappropriation of an invention by sophisticated parties, is ideal. 
Finally, one argument is that proper claim drafting will alleviate 
many of the problems with enforcement that claims requiring the 
actions of multiple parties create.380  However, in order to accurately 
claim an invention, some claims cannot be written to capture a single 
infringer.381  Further, technology exists that allows claims properly 
directed to a single infringer to be performed by more than one 
party.382  Accordingly, while proper claim drafting may address 
fundamental mistakes, it is not a blanket solution. 
In sum, the law should undertake a more flexible procedure for 
determining when a method claim is infringed by separate entities 
each performing separate steps of the method claim.  Accordingly, 
instead of relying on inducement theory or focusing solely on the 
nature of the relationship between relevant actors, this article 
suggests a broader approach detailed below.383 
                                                 
 376. See id. (stating that joint infringement unreasonably expands liability). 
 377. See id. at 261 (discussing cases where alleged infringers were customers of the 
defendant). 
 378. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2006) (exempting medical practitioners and 
health care entities from infringement for performance of a medical activity). 
 379. See, e.g., McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301; Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 
F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC Res., Inc. 
v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 
F.3d 1301. 
 380. See Lemley et al., supra note 33, at 272 (proposing that drafting a unitary 
claim will avoid the pitfalls of attempting to prove indirect infringement). 
 381. See Lee, supra note 39, at 349 (“Because most Internet activities involve 
connecting a computer to the Internet, it is likely that the inventiveness of Internet-
related patents lies in the combinations of steps and elements, and not in an 
individual step or element that is obvious or known.”). 
 382. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369–71 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing a patented computer system integrating dispatch clinical 
services and billing data into one module). 
 383. See discussion infra Part III. 
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III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
A. Overview 
The current test for joint infringement relies on an inducement 
theory.  Further, the proposed tests for joint infringement in Judge 
Linn’s dissent focus solely on the nature of the relationship between 
relevant actors.384  This section identifies additional considerations 
that should factor into a joint infringement determination.  Given 
these considerations, this section proposes a test for determining 
when a method claim is infringed if separate entities each perform 
separate steps of the method claim.  The goal of the tests is (1) to 
take into account the various ways joint infringement can occur and 
(2) to yield fair, consistent, and predictable results upon application.  
How the law will apportion liability amongst two or more joint 
infringers is beyond the scope of this paper.385  Incorporating these 
tests into a judicial or legislative framework for reform will afford 
courts more flexibility in analyzing joint infringement cases.  In sum, 
a new, more flexible standard for enforcement will encourage 
patentees to continue to file applications for innovative interactive 
method inventions.386 
There are generally three claim scenarios in which joint 
infringement is asserted.  In the first scenario, the patentee has 
poorly drafted claims directed to more than one entity, much like in 
BMC.387  The second scenario involves “single entity claims” where 
the patentee has drafted claims directed to a single infringer, but the 
nature of the method allows for the actors to split up performance of 
the steps and obtain some benefit.388  In the third scenario, called 
“interactive claims,” the method is interactive in nature, requiring 
the patentee to include multiple actors in the claim.389  BMC provided 
                                                 
 384. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1380 (requiring proof of a mastermind’s control 
or direction over the entire process in a joint infringement claim); BMC, 498 F.3d at 
1380 (finding that courts generally refuse to find liability where one party did not 
control or direct each step of the patented process. 
 385. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *15 (“How much each 
party is accountable is a matter of apportionment more suitable for damages 
calculations rather than liability determination.”). 
 386. See McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 1291 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (warning that the court has created a 
cynical and expensive delusion to encourage innovators to develop unenforceable 
patents for interactive technologies), rev’d en banc, per curiam sub nom. Akamai II, 692 
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 387. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1375–77 (describing BMC’s infringement claim, which 
involved customer use of the patent). 
 388. See Larsen, supra note 191, at 63 (arguing that this type of claim should have 
no less of a right to exclude others). 
 389. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *16 (“If the essence of 
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a simple solution for the first scenario:  Draft better claims.390  
However, the Federal Circuit has not distinguished between joint 
infringement of claims directed to a single entity and joint 
infringement of claims that require the participation of multiple 
actors.391  What follows is a flexible proposal for addressing the second 
and third scenarios. 
B. Single Entity Claims 
The following approach applies to a claim in which all the steps of 
a method claim are directed to a single infringer or the claim does 
not require performance of the steps by multiple parties.  These 
claims presumably do not have the same drafting problems as the 
claims in BMC.392  Unfortunately, multiple entities may still split up 
the performance of these steps for their mutual benefit.393  Where 
insufficient evidence of the nature of the relationship between 
relevant actors exists, this approach recommends that the court take 
into account evidence of collaboration, concerted action, and the 
benefit realized to determine if there should be joint infringement 
liability.394  In addition, the approach suggests that factors considered 
traditionally at common law, the nature of the activity and intent, also 
be taken into account. 
1. The Golden Hour factors 
Proper claim drafting cannot solve every problem.  This is 
especially true where all the steps of a method claim are directed to a 
single infringer or do not require performance of the steps by 
multiple parties.  An example of how this type of claim might be 
written is included below: 
15.  A computerized method of generating a patient encounter 
record, comprising the steps of: 
                                                 
the invention is the interaction between users . . . the patentee should not be forced 
to draft claims . . . to capture a single user . . . .”). 
 390. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“A patentee can usually structure a claim to 
capture infringement by a single party.”). 
 391. See McKesson, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (combining actions of multiple 
parties to perform the steps of a claim, but requiring one party—or single entity—to 
exercise control); Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
plaintiff put itself in a position where it would have to attribute actions of third 
parties to the defendant, culminating in a single entity claim), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 392. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (“BMC chose . . . to have four different parties 
perform different acts within one claim.”). 
 393. See Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (discussing a comprehensive data system where each component is capable of 
being used by different parties). 
 394. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
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collecting flight information relating to an emergency transport 
crew dispatch; 
collecting patient information from a clinical encounter associated 
with a patient incident requiring emergency medical care by the 
emergency transport crew; and 
integrating the patient information with the flight information to 
produce an encounter record indicative of the patient’s clinical 
encounter.395 
Unfortunately, current technology could allow for two or more 
entities to split performance of these steps and still implement a 
beneficial and useful process.  As of the writing of this paper, if more 
than one party performed each of the steps, under the current 
inducement standard, the patentee would have to prove that one of 
the parties induced the other in performance of the method steps.396  
Absent this showing, two sophisticated parties could split 
performance of a claimed method for their mutual benefit.397  Relying 
on the facts in Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc.398 the 
proposed recommendation attempts to address this scenario in a way 
that does not ensnare innocent actors and yet provides a consistent 
framework for enforcement.399 
a. Collaboration or partnership 
Where the steps of an asserted method claim are directed to a 
single entity or do not require performance of multiple parties and 
are performed by more than one party, evidence of a collaboration or 
partnership between the parties should weigh in favor of a finding of 
joint infringement.  The determination of whether a collaboration or 
partnership exists should depend on the facts of the case.  One 
amicus curiae has argued that there must be a legal tie between two 
parties in order for there to be a finding of joint infringement.400  
                                                 
 395. U.S. Patent No. 6,117,073, at col. 21 l. 54–col. 22 l.7 (filed Mar. 2, 1998). 
 396. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the courts’ use of the direction or 
control standard). 
 397. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1371 (discussing defendants’ collaboration to 
combine their systems into one unit). 
 398. 614 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 399. Softtech (a company that produced computer-aided flight dispatch software) 
and emsCharts (a company that provided a web-based patient information and 
billing system) formed a partnership enabling their two programs to work together.  
Id. at 1371.  This collaboration created a unit that resembled Golden Hour’s 
comprehensive system.  See id. at 1369–70 (describing Golden Hour’s patent). 
 400. See Amici Curiae Internet Retailers’ Brief in Support of Defendant/Cross-
Appellant’s En Banc Response Brief at 6, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (Nos. 2009-1372, -1380, -1416, -1417), 2011 WL 3796786, at 
*6 (setting forth a test to determine quality of a sufficiently significant legal 
relationship as to whether there is a contractual obligation). 
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However, requiring a legal relationship leaves open the opportunity 
for gamesmanship of the system.401  Instead, evidence such as joint 
sales activities, joint promotional activities, and any other joint activity 
with respect to the accused method should weigh in favor of a finding 
of joint infringement.402  Joint activity by itself is not enough, however.  
The law should also take other considerations such as the action of 
the parties into account. 
b. Concerted action 
The performance of all the steps of a claimed method by the 
concerted action of all of the relevant actors should weigh in favor of 
a finding of joint infringement.  In Wallace v. Holmes the court held 
that two parties jointly infringed a patent by acting in concert with 
each other.403  Further, the court in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener 
Co. stated that when patent infringement is brought about by a 
“concert of action,” all engaged directly and intentionally are joint 
infringers.404  Moreover, the Second Restatement of Torts states that a 
party is subject to liability if he “does a tortious act in concert with 
the other or pursuant to a common design with him.”405 
The facts in Golden Hour are an example of “concerted action.”  At 
trial, the jury found that two companies, emsCharts and Softech 
enabled their respective programs to work together such that their 
combined system, which they sold as a package, met all the 
limitations of several of the asserted claims.406  Similar evidence of 
action on behalf of each party to perform claimed steps of a method 
would probably rise to the level of “concerted action.”  Finally, 
whether the parties acted in concert or not, the benefit of their 
actions should also be examined. 
c. Benefit 
Evidence of either an entity obtaining a commercial (competitive 
or financial) benefit should weigh in favor of a finding of joint 
                                                 
 401. See Golden Hour Data Sys. v. emsCharts, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 
1568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“The agreement defined the relationship as not creating ‘any 
agency, partnership, joint venture, or employer/employee relationship.’”), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 614 F.3d 1367. 
 402. Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of 
Neither Party, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(Nos. 2009-1372, -1380, -1416, -1417), 2011 WL 3101890, at *27–28. 
 403. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). 
 404. Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 
297 (6th Cir. 1896). 
 405. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979). 
 406. Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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infringement.  Patent law has created legal doctrines that prevent 
infringers from stealing the benefit of an invention.407  Further, courts 
have found parties liable for contributory infringement to prevent 
them from obtaining the benefit of a patent.408  In addition, 
European law allows patentees to recover under its own “partial 
infringement” theory in order to prevent infringers from 
appropriating the commercial benefit of the invention.409  
Accordingly, an inquiry into what benefit is obtained by the relevant 
actors is supported by both domestic and international law and 
policy. 
Once again, the facts in Golden Hour illustrate this principle. 
Softech and emsCharts both benefited economically and 
competitively by selling their combined system.410  That is, in the 
absence of evidence that one party directed or controlled the other, 
emsCharts and Softech thwarted the policy of the patent system by 
misappropriating the benefit of an invention.411 
2. Other factors for consideration 
In addition to the Golden Hour factors enumerated above, the law 
should consider at least two other factors.412  The intent of the parties 
could be examined.  In addition, the law could analyze the nature of 
the alleged infringing activities being performed by each party. 
For example, absent a showing of direction or control, 
performance of a step like the “initiating step” in McKesson should 
weigh against a finding of joint infringement.413  Such an initiating 
step is superfluous and is exactly the type of claim language that the 
Federal Circuit has said it will not rewrite.414  Further, the law should 
                                                 
 407. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 
1948) (describing the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents to achieve this result). 
 408. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207, 212, 253 (D. 
Conn. 1973) (allowing plaintiff’s claim for contributory infringement where the 
defendant was able to achieve all benefits of its patent by making each of its 
customers its agents in completing the infringing step). 
 409. See Pagenberg, supra note 362, at 319–21 (discussing the French and German 
approaches). 
 410. Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1383 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 411. Id. at 1382–83. 
 412. These factors are not new.  They are similar to the factors courts analyzed 
before the 1952 Patent Act and district courts took note of after BMC.  See discussion 
supra Part II. 
 413. For an example of drafting such an initiating step, see U.S. Patent No. 
6,757,898, col. 44 l. 60–col. 45 l. 24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000) (describing the step of 
“initiating a communication by one of the plurality of users to the provider for 
information, wherein the provider has established a preexisting medical record for 
each user”). 
 414. The Federal Circuit has stated: 
The steps of the claim might have featured references to a single party’s 
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discourage similar claim language that is indicative of non-
commercial consumer participation.415  That is, performance of a 
claimed step that is for that party’s own private benefit or use should 
also weigh against a finding of joint infringement.416 
In contrast, a commercial step similar to the “tagging step” in 
Akamai I would weigh in favor of a finding of joint infringement.417  
The “tagging step” is analogous to the act of the customer who 
supplied the chimney in Wallace to complete the lamp.418  That is, this 
step is of the character that it simply must be performed for any 
beneficial use of the method to be realized and could be performed 
by any party. 
Further, similar to early contributory infringement cases, the law 
should also consider the intent of the parties.419  Liability for direct 
infringement does not require a showing of intent.420  Accordingly, 
this proposal does not suggest that intent (knowledge or willful 
blindness) be required.421  Instead, this recommendation suggests 
only that evidence of intent by one or more parties weigh in favor of a 
finding of joint infringement. 
                                                 
supplying or receiving each element of the claimed process.  However, BMC 
chose instead to have four different parties perform different acts within one 
claim.  BMC correctly notes the difficulty of proving infringement of this 
claim format.  Nonetheless, this court will not unilaterally restructure the 
claim or the standards for joint infringement to remedy these ill-conceived 
claims. 
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by 
Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 415. See Harold C. Wegner, E-Business Patent Infringement:  Quest for a Direct 
Infringement Claim Model 13–15 (Nov. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/open_materials/10th/en/wegner-
en.pdf (tracing the joint infringement theory in Supreme Court and appellate case 
law). 
 416. Mizutani, supra note 333, at 89–90 (distinguishing the implications of 
consumers using patented technology for private or commercial benefits). 
 417. See U.S. Patent No. 6,108,703, col. 6 l. 41–46 (filed May 19, 1999) (outlining a 
similar commercial step); see also Akamai I, 629 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(describing the customer’s use of the “tagging” feature), rev’d, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 418. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 79 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). 
 419. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912) (considering the intent 
and purpose of the defendant when determining whether infringement occurred), 
overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 
(1917). 
 420. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (lacking intent in the statutory language dictating 
that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent”). 
 421. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2066 (2011) 
(discussing earlier cases requiring an intention to bring about a patent’s specific 
use).  Not requiring intent distinguishes the proposed test from § 271(b) and (c), 
which require inducement or knowing respectively. 
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3. Summary 
In sum, the above approach applies only to claims where all the 
steps of a method claim are directed to a single infringer or do not 
require performance of the steps by multiple parties.  These claims 
presumably do not have the same drafting problems as the claims in 
BMC.422  Unfortunately, advances in technology may nevertheless 
allow multiple entities to split up the claimed method steps.423  Where 
no evidence of direction or control, agency or a contractual 
obligation is present, this approach recommends that the court take 
into account and weigh the factors outlined above to determine if 
there should be joint infringement liability. 
C. “Interactive Claims” 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s warning concerning claim drafting, 
patentees have the option to draft method claims that require the 
actions of more than one actor.424  There may be many reasons 
patentees draft claims this way; for example, interactive claim 
language may be the best way to capture the interactive nature of the 
invention.425  For the purpose of this discussion, these claims will be 
referred to as “interactive claims.”  In either case, the inducement-
only rule and the direction or control test place a patentee seeking to 
enforce interactive claims at a severe disadvantage.426  As one amicus 
curiae explained, if the invention is interactive in nature, the 
patentee should not be forced to draft claims directed to single 
infringers so that those claims can then be enforced.427 
The proposed approach undertakes a two-step procedure in order 
to determine joint infringement liability.  First, it suggests that the 
patentee provide a rationale for an asserted claim’s interactivity.428  
                                                 
 422. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(noting that BMC could have drafted its claim to focus on one entity instead of 
having four parties perform different acts within one claim in order to avoid 
infringement), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 423. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (involving combined actions of the patent by multiple parties). 
 424. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381 (highlighting that BMC chose to structure their 
claim to require four different actors). 
 425. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *16. 
 426. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (finding no liability for direct infringement and no legal theory to support 
joint infringement where no evidence of direction or control was presented), 
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381–82 (stressing the 
importance of the direction or control test in determining whether infringement has 
occurred). 
 427. Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 339, at *16. 
 428. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
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Second, the proposed standard suggests that the court apply a test for 
joint infringement based on the result of the interactivity inquiry.429  
Accordingly, the proposed standard does not force a patentee to 
draft claims directed to a single infringer by providing a flexible 
alternative to the newly minted inducement-only test. 
1. Nexus between interactivity and patentability 
The proposed standard borrows loosely from the general 
framework set forth in Warner-Jenkins Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.  
In Warner-Jenkins, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for the 
doctrine of equivalents.430  Similar to the joint infringement doctrine, 
one of the major concerns of the court in Warner-Jenkins was giving 
proper deference to the role of claim drafting in providing public 
notice and defining the invention.431  Accordingly, the proposed test 
is narrowly defined to avoid conflict with the public-notice function 
of the statutory claiming requirement.432 
The proposed test recommends that the law inquire as to whether 
there is a nexus between the “interactivity” of a method claim (that 
is, the reason why the claims require more than one actor) and the 
patentability of the claim.433  Evidence that a proposed claim’s 
interactivity was a factor in its allowance may indicate that the USPTO 
granted the patentee a limited monopoly because the claim’s 
“interactivity” was at least part of what made the claim novel and 
nonobvious.434  Imposing a rigid standard for enforcement such as the 
inducement-only direction or control test on these types of 
interactive claims would severely frustrate the patentee’s ability to 
enforce that monopoly.435  If a nexus exists, then under this 
                                                 
 429. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 430. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) 
(stating that the introduction of a new element does not preclude infringement by 
equivalents of that element). 
 431. Id. (“Mindful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice 
function, we think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent holder to 
establish the reason for an amendment required during patent prosecution.”). 
 432. Id. at 29 (quoting Judge Nies, stating that “[a] distinction can be drawn . . . 
between substitution of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging 
the metes and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 433. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
 434. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006) (setting forth the conditions for patentability). 
 435. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); 
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301.  Further, it is foreseeable that a test for 
infringement that focuses on the type of relationship between the parties could cause 
a patentee to spend a great deal of time attempting to broadly claim the relationship 
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recommendation, the inducement-only test would not be the 
determinative inquiry in establishing whether the claim is jointly 
infringed.  Instead, this proposal suggests that if there is a nexus 
between the interactivity of the claim and its patentability, the law 
should weigh the factors outlined in Part III.B. to determine joint 
infringement liability.436 
Alternatively, the lack of a nexus between the interactivity of a 
claim and its patentability may suggest that interactivity is secondary 
to other limitations in the claim or that the claim could have been 
written so that it was directed to a single infringer.437  If there is no 
nexus between the interactivity of a claim and its patentability, then 
the law should focus on the nature of the relationship between the 
relevant actors in determining whether a claim was infringed.438  That 
is, such claims would be analyzed to determine whether one party 
had direction or control over another.439  Thus, by inquiring into the 
significance of the presence of multiple actors in a claim, the 
proposed recommendation balances the challenge of describing new 
inventions in words with the role of claim drafting in providing 
public notice and clearly defining the invention.440 
2. Proof of a nexus 
This section briefly describes how an inquiry into whether there is a 
nexus between the “interactivity” of a method claim and the 
patentability of the claim may work in practice.  In order to make the 
evidentiary showing of a nexus, a patentee would primarily rely on 
intrinsic evidence.441  The law would set forth what a “nexus” means 
in this context.  For example, it could mean that the claimed 
interactivity is “the reason for,” “reasonably related to,” or 
“substantially related to” the patentability of the claim.442  In 
                                                 
between different parties in the claim instead of focusing on the technical innovation 
of the invention. 
 436. See discussion supra Part III.B (explaining that several factors, including 
collaboration, concerted action, the benefit obtained, the nature of the activity being 
performed, and intent, should be considered in a joint infringement determination). 
 437. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381; Lemley et al., supra note 33, at 256. 
 438. See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1327; BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381–82. 
 439. See BMC, 498 F.3d 1373 at 1381–82. 
 440. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) 
(declaring that it is the burden of the patent holder to establish the reason for 
amending a claim during patent prosecution, and then the court would decide 
whether that reason was sufficient). 
 441. Accordingly, statements made in the specification and prosecution history 
would be instrumental in determining whether the interactivity of the claim was 
related to patentability of the claims. 
 442. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 (requiring courts to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether a claim amendment was substantially related to patentability). 
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implementation, a broad approach would take into account 
statements in the specification, the preamble, and the prosecution 
history.  A more narrow approach would focus specifically on why the 
claim was allowed, relying primarily on the prosecution history.  
Further, to prevent future patentees from gaming the system by 
simply adding new elements distinguishable enough to avoid 
infringement under the current law, an ideal standard would 
emphasize the prosecution history and the examiner’s reasons for 
allowance.  To prevent further complexity, it might also be necessary 
to restrict the term “patentability” to novel and obviousness 
concerns.443 
This recommendation accomplishes two things.  First, it provides a 
lower hurdle of enforcement for truly innovative interactive method 
claims.444  Second, it protects innocent actors from being subject to 
liability for infringement based on poorly drafted claims.445  Critics 
may argue that this would lead to inconsistent results.  However, 
while the outcome of some cases may change, a preliminary analysis 
of the main joint infringement cases heard by the Federal Circuit 
indicates that many of its decisions finding no joint infringement 
would be upheld under the proposed recommendation. 
For example, under the proposed interactivity test outlined above, 
the interactive claims asserted in BMC, Muniauction, and McKesson 
would all still be subject to the direction or control test instead of the 
more flexible test articulated in Part III.B.  The claims at issue in 
these cases would be subject to the direction or control test because 
there is little evidence of a nexus between the interactivity of the 
claims and their patentability. 
In U.S. Patent No. 5,715,298 (asserted in BMC), for example, the 
examiner allowed the application because the prior art did not 
suggest using a telephone in carrying out the claimed method.446  
That is, there is no indication that the claimed involvement of various 
actors was novel or nonobvious.447  Similarly, in Muniauction, the 
asserted claims included steps performed by the bidder and the 
                                                 
 443. For example, the proposed “patentability” determination would ignore 
considerations arising under §§ 101 and 112. 
 444. Interactive claims with a nexus between interactivity and patentability would 
be subject to the tests outlined in Part III.B and would not be subject to the direction 
or control test. 
 445. Claims that lacked a nexus between interactivity and patentability would be 
subject to the rigid direction or control test. 
 446. See Notice of Allowability, App. No. 08/787981, at 3–4 (Sept. 2, 1997) 
(specifying that a web browser was a component excluded from the claim). 
 447. Id. 
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auction service provider.448  During prosecution, the patentee argued 
that their claims were patentable over the prior art primarily because 
they required the use of a web browser.449  The Examiner agreed.450  
Once again, no indication is present that the claimed participation of 
the bidder and service provider is related to patentability of the 
asserted claims.451  Finally, in McKesson one of the asserted claims 
required the actions of both a patient and a healthcare provider.452  
However, the claim was allowed because the prior art failed to 
disclose the limitation automatically generating a patient page/area 
within the provider’s website.453  That is, there is no indication that 
the claimed participation of the patient and healthcare provider are 
related to patentability of the asserted claims.454  Accordingly, while 
the proposed recommendation is more flexible, as seen in the 
examples above, it is also narrowly tailored so that it would not result 
in an upheaval of the status quo. 
D. Advantages of the Proposed Approach 
The proposed recommendation accomplishes two objectives.  First, 
it permits patentees of claims directed to a single infringer the 
opportunity to enforce those claims against opportunistic parties.455  
Second, it gives patentees of truly innovative interactive patents the 
ability to enforce their patents.456 
Under both parts of the proposal, the goal is to craft standards that 
are fair and rooted in the law.  For example, under certain 
conditions, the proposed approach recommends that a court 
evaluate and weigh certain factors to determine joint infringement 
liability.457  Some of these factors find their origin in the common law 
concerning contributory infringement codified by the Patent Act of 
1952.458  In addition, the factors allow a court to prevent an innocent 
actor from being subject to joint infringement liability.459  Similarly, 
                                                 
 448. See U.S. Patent No. 6,161,099, col. 12 l. 64–col. 20 l. 11 (filed May 29, 1998). 
 449. Notice of Allowability, App. No. 09/087,574, at 4 (Aug. 24, 2000). 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at 3–4. 
 452. See U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898, col. 44 l. 60–col. 45 l. 24 (filed Jan. 18, 2000). 
 453. See McKesson’s Opening Claim Construction Brief at 14, McKesson Info. 
Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (No. 1:06-CV-
2965 JTC), 2007 WL 5283762. 
 454. Id. 
 455. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 456. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 457. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 458. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 459. See discussion supra Part III.B.2; see also Wegner, supra note 415, at 10–13 
(describing joint infringement theory). 
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the proposal prevents an online service provider from being exposed 
to patent infringement liability by simply providing a service to its 
customers.460 
The proposed recommendations do not attempt to resolve the 
issues concerning the single entity doctrine.  Instead, they provide a 
flexible alternative.  One amicus brief, arguing in favor of the single 
entity rule, asserted that if a person does not perform each step of a 
claimed method, then that person does not appropriate the full 
economic value of the claimed invention.461  However, in Akamai II, 
the Federal Circuit opined that an inducer has the same impact on 
the patentee whether he induces one party or multiple parties to 
infringe.462  Under this “same impact” rationale, one could argue that 
multiple parties, whose combined actions infringe a patent, 
knowingly or unknowingly, also have the same impact on the 
patentee.  Accordingly, the proposal set forth in this article suggests 
that specific factors concerning the alleged infringing parties must be 
weighed including evidence of either party obtaining a commercial 
(competitive or financial) benefit.463 
Finally, the proposed recommendation would not encourage or 
benefit poorly drafted claims.464  Claims of the type that the courts 
have typically considered poorly drafted would not be subject to a 
standard less rigid than direction or control unless there was 
evidence of a nexus between the interactivity of the claim and its 
patentability.465  In fact, the proposed standard may result in a more 
robust specification and more directed arguments during 
prosecution.466  Further, the nexus requirement prevents this 
approach from broad application, which would defeat the 
definitional and public notice functions of claim drafting.467 
                                                 
 460. Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in 
Support of Defendant-Cross Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 5–6, Akamai II, 692 
F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (Nos. 2009-1372, -1380, -1417), 
2011 WL 3796788 (asserting that customers visiting a website should not expose an 
online retailer to patent infringement). 
 461. Id. at 4 (“[A] person who does not practice every step of a method claim does 
not appropriate the full economic value of the claimed invention . . . .”). 
 462. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1308. 
 463. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 464. See supra Part III.C. 
 465. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 466. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 467. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) 
(discussing the scope of the doctrine of equivalents and stating “[t]here can be no 
denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the 
definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement”). 
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In sum, the proposed approach recognizes that the issue of joint 
infringement can arise in different ways depending upon the asserted 
claim.  Accordingly, the proposed approach suggests that the law 
should address these fact patterns in a more elegant way.  As a result, 
the proposal grants patentees a better opportunity to enforce their 
claims while protecting innocent actors from liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s new joint infringement test focuses solely on 
whether an accused infringer induced a third party to perform some 
or all of the steps of a claimed method.468  Focusing on the 
inducement inquiry ignores other practical factors that should be 
considered in determining liability for joint infringement.469  Further, 
absent evidence of inducement, the Federal Circuit’s joint 
infringement test does nothing to close the judicial loophole.470  
Accordingly, the law should undertake a more flexible procedure for 
determining joint infringement liability. 
The proposed approach suggests that the law impose a two-part test 
for determining if a method claim is infringed when separate entities 
each perform separate steps of a method claim.471  The first part of 
the test applies to (1) claims directed to a single entity or (2) claims 
that do not require participation of multiple entities.472  For these 
claims, in addition to the relationship between relevant actors, the 
law should consider and weigh several factors such as concerted 
action, commercial benefit, intent, and the nature of the activity 
performed.473  The test’s second part applies to claims that specifically 
require participation of multiple entities.474  Here, the law should only 
                                                 
 468. See Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(explaining that Limelight would be liable for inducement if “(1) Limelight knew of 
Akamai’s patent, (2) it performed all but one of the steps of the method claim, (3) it 
induced [its customers] to perform the final step . . . and (4) the [customers] in fact 
performed that final step”). 
 469. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (Newton, J., dissenting) (suggesting the matter should be stayed until 
conflicting precedent regarding the factors considered is resolved); Thomson-
Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 723 (6th Cir. 1897) (reviewing intent 
of the alleged infringer); Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) 
(No. 17,100) (examining the useless nature of the components of the patents alone 
and the inference that the components would be used together). 
 470. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 471. See supra Part III. 
 472. See supra Part III.B. 
 473. See Golden Hour, 614 F.3d at 1382 (Newton, J., dissenting); Thomson-Houston, 
80 F. at 723; Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80. 
 474. See supra Part III.C. 
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consider the factors listed above if there is a nexus between the 
interactivity of the claim and patentability.475  If no nexus exists, 
liability should be determined by ascertaining whether there was 
inducement or considering the nature of the relationship between 
relevant actors.476 
The approach outlined above (1) prevents misappropriation of 
new Information Age technology, (2) promotes the public notice 
function served by well-crafted claims, and (3) shields innocent actors 
from strict liability.  Moreover, by providing more flexibility for 
enforcement of interactive methods, the proposed approach 
encourages innovation and advances the constitutional policies 
underlying the Patent Act. 
                                                 
 475. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 476. See, e.g., Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per 
curiam); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301; BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 
F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
